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THE SUPREME COURT 
2014 TERM 
FOREWORD: 
DOES THE CONSTITUTION MEAN WHAT IT SAYS? 
David A. Strauss 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION VERSUS THE TEXT? 
A.  Anomalies 
hat do you do when there is a practice that flatly contradicts a 
clear text of the Constitution?  Which of the two prevails?”1  
Justice Scalia asked the Solicitor General that question during the oral 
argument in NLRB v. Noel Canning,2 the case about the President’s 
power to make recess appointments that was decided during the Su-
preme Court’s 2013 Term.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit had held that the text of the Recess Appointments 
Clause did not permit the President to make recess appointments in 
circumstances in which, the government argued, the President had 
been making those appointments for decades.3  If the D.C. Circuit  
was right about the clear meaning of the text, shouldn’t it — Justice 
Scalia’s question suggested — prevail over even a well-established 
practice? 
The Solicitor General questioned the premise that the language was 
clear, but his answer was that “the practice has to prevail,” even over 
clear language.4  He explained, though, that “we don’t have that here” 
because “[t]his provision has been subject to contention as to its mean-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Chicago.  I am 
grateful to William Baude, Paul Crane, Andrew Crespo, Ryan Doerfler, Vicki Jackson, Richard 
Lazarus, Brian Leiter, Richard McAdams, Jennifer Nou, Martha Nussbaum, Louis Michael 
Seidman, Mark Tushnet, Adrian Vermeule, David Weisbach, and participants in workshops at the 
Harvard Law School and the University of Chicago Law School for discussion and comments; to 
the Burton and Adrienne Glazov Faculty Fund at the University of Chicago for financial support; 
and to Lauren Walas and Kendell Coates for excellent research assistance. 
 1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014) (No. 12-
1281), h t t p : / / w w w . s u p r e m e c o u r t . g o v / o r a l _ a r g u m e n t s / a r g u m e n t _ t r a n s c r i p t s / 1 2 - 1 2 8 1 _ p m 0 2 . p d f  
[h t t p : / / p e r m a . c c / 5 Z P P - 3 5 4 K ]. 
 2 134 S. Ct. 2550. 
 3 See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 134 
S. Ct. 2550. 
 4 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 6. 
“W 
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ing since the first days of the Republic.”5  In fact, the Solicitor General 
said, “[i]t’s extremely unlikely that [the question] would arise if the text 
were so free of doubt.”6 
Actually, it might not be unlikely at all.  If we read the text of the 
Constitution in a straightforward way, American constitutional law 
“contradicts” the text of the Constitution more often than one might 
think.  Adhering to the text would require us to relinquish many of the 
most important and well-established principles of constitutional law.  
Here are some examples of the anomalies — outcomes that are incon-
sistent with established principles of constitutional law — that follow-
ing the text of the Constitution would produce: 
 Both the President and the federal courts could abridge the free-
dom of speech and prohibit the free exercise of religion, because 
the First Amendment, by its terms, applies only to “Congress.”7 
 A state could have an established church. 
 The requirement that “searches” not be “unreasonable” would not 
apply to the interception of many electronic communications.8 
 States could disenfranchise, for example, poor people or gay peo-
ple, because the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not protect the right to vote. 
 States could discriminate against racial minorities, or any other 
group, in providing, for example, schools, parks, or transporta-
tion, because the Equal Protection Clause, by its terms, refers 
only to “protection.”9 
 The federal government would be free to engage in discrimina-
tion on the basis of race or sex, because the Equal Protection 
Clause applies only to the states. 
 The federal government, under a standard application of the 
principle of expressio unius, could not enact criminal laws, ex-
cept in certain narrow areas. 
 The Bill of Rights would not apply, in whole or with the current 
exceptions, to the states. 
 States would not be immune from suit when federal statutes 
made them liable, at least in state courts and when sued by their 
own citizens in federal court. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 Id. at 8.  
 6 Id.  
 7 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 8 See id. amend. IV. 
 9 See id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Some of these examples are well known, like the principle of 
Bolling v. Sharpe,10 according to which the law developed under the 
Equal Protection Clause applies to the federal government.11  Other 
instances in which we have departed from the text of the Constitution 
are obvious but more or less systematically ignored, like the fact that 
the First Amendment begins with “Congress.”  Others require more 
explanation, which I will provide.  But the important point is that  
these examples cannot be dismissed as curiosities that don’t really 
have much to do with the nature of American constitutional law.  
They involve important and well-established principles of constitu-
tional law that are inconsistent with the text.  They are anomalies not 
in the sense that they are odd excrescences but in the sense that they 
call into question our familiar way of thinking about the relationship 
between the text of the Constitution and constitutional law.12 
That familiar way of thinking, I believe, goes something like this: 
Constitutional law is derived from the text of the Constitution.  Some-
times the text is clear; if so, it controls.  But many provisions are not 
clear.  They must be “interpreted” according to relatively familiar, if 
sometimes controversial, principles.  Always, though, constitutional 
law begins with the text and proceeds from there. 
That familiar view misdescribes American constitutional law.  
Clear text does not always govern, as the anomalies show; there are 
times when established principles are simply inconsistent with the text.  
Beyond that, constitutional “interpretation” usually has little to do, in 
practice, with the words of the text.  There are times when the text is 
decisive, and it is never acceptable to announce that you are ignoring 
the text.  But routinely the text, although not flatly inconsistent with 
the outcome of a case, has very little to do with the way the case is ar-
gued or decided.  In most litigated cases, constitutional law resembles 
the common law much more closely than it resembles a text-based  
system.13 
So there is a puzzle: How can we make sense of a system that 
treats the text in this way?  If the familiar understanding — start with 
the text, and proceed from there — is incorrect, just what role does the 
text play, and how can that role be harmonized with the other sources 
of constitutional law? 
The answer, I think, is that provisions of the text of the Constitu-
tion are, to a first approximation, treated in more or less the same way 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 11 See id. at 499–500. 
 12 This use of the term “anomaly” is associated with THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE 
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS ch. VI (1962).  
 13 For an extended defense of this claim, see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITU-
TION (2010).  
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as precedents in a common law system.  The effect of constitutional 
provisions is not fixed at their adoption — or, for that matter, at any 
other time.  Instead, like precedents, provisions are expanded, limited, 
qualified, reconceived, relegated to the background, or all-but-ignored, 
depending on what comes afterward — on subsequent decisions and 
on judgments about the direction in which the law should develop. 
As a result, a provision of the Constitution will be most important 
when there are not a lot of subsequent precedents “interpreting” it.  
Once a large body of precedent-based law has developed, the text will 
recede from view.  Like a venerated old case, a textual provision might 
be invoked for rhetorical effect and maybe even for more than that — 
in the way that, for example, Marbury v. Madison14 might be invoked 
when a court is considering the constitutionality of an act of Congress.  
But just as the reasoning and precise holding of Marbury do not de-
termine the scope of judicial review today, so the text of the Constitu-
tion often does not determine the shape of constitutional law today — 
as the anomalies dramatically show.  It is true that the Supreme Court 
would never “overrule” a provision of the text, in the way it might 
overrule a precedent.  But the anomalies — instances in which the text 
has been effectively overridden by later developments — suggest that 
there is less to this difference than meets the eye. 
These claims will have to be qualified in some important ways.  
But I believe the idea that provisions of the Constitution function 
roughly in the same way as precedents in a common law system is a 
better description of U.S. constitutional law than the familiar view that 
constitutional law is a matter of “following” or “interpreting” those 
provisions.  And because the common law is a well-established ap-
proach to the law that has plausible (at least) justifications,15 under-
standing constitutional law as an evolutionary, common law system 
avoids the notorious problem of explaining why constitutional provi-
sions adopted decades or centuries ago should continue to bind us  
today.  
B.  October Term, 2014 
Noel Canning was unusual because the parties and the Court ex-
plicitly considered the role of the text and its arguable conflict with es-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  
 15 For a summary of those justifications, see, for example, David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 893 & n.41 (1996) (citing Calvin’s Case, 
(1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 381; 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 3b; EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE 
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 58–59, 84 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1940) (1790); MATTHEW HALE, RE-
FLECTIONS BY THE LRD. CHEIFE JUSTICE HALE ON MR. HOBBES HIS DIALOGUE OF THE 
LAWE, reprinted in 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW app. at 500, 504 
(2d ed., rev. 1937)). 
  
6 HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 129:1 
tablished practices.  More often, these self-conscious questions about 
the text are not addressed, even though the treatment of the text is just 
as puzzling.  Most of the time, in litigated cases, the text makes only a 
token appearance; sometimes, although rarely, it is central; occasional-
ly it is something in between.  Last Term’s decisions provide plenty of 
examples. 
In Obergefell v. Hodges,16 which invalidated state laws limiting 
marriage to opposite-sex couples, the text of the Constitution made on-
ly a cameo appearance.  The opinion of the Court relied on “the prin-
ciples and precedents that govern these cases.”17  Those principles 
were derived mostly from the Court’s previous decisions;18 from “the 
Nation’s traditions”;19 and, although the opinion did not put it in quite 
these terms, from the Court’s own essentially moral judgment that 
same-sex marriage should be permitted.20  The Court invoked the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment21 and, secondarily, the 
Equal Protection Clause,22 but it seems fair to say that those provi-
sions functioned as sources of inspiration, roughly in the way that a 
revered nonlegal document like the Declaration of Independence 
might.  
Obergefell is, of course, an unusual case in many ways.  The hold-
ing was momentous and controversial, and the opinion had an oracu-
lar tone, often relying on abstract formulations.  The Court in 
Obergefell explicitly conflated the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses,23 and that is unusual.  But in substance it is a common law–
like opinion; or at least a common law approach is broadly consistent 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 17 Id. at 2593.  
 18 See id. at 2597 (“Numerous cases about same-sex marriage have reached the United States 
Courts of Appeals in recent years. . . . That case law helps to explain and formulate the underly-
ing principles this Court now must consider.”); id. at 2599 (“A first premise of the Court’s relevant 
precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of in-
dividual autonomy.”); id. (“A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to 
marry is fundamental . . . .”); id. at 2600 (“A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it 
safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, pro-
creation, and education.” (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923))); id. at 2601 (“Fourth and finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s 
traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”).  
 19 Id. at 2601. 
 20 See, e.g., id. at 2598 (“The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it in our own 
times. . . . When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a 
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.”); id. at 2602 (“It demeans gays and 
lesbians for the State to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation’s society.”).  
 21 Id. at 2597. 
 22 Id. at 2602–03.  
 23 See id. (“The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a pro-
found way . . . .”); id. at 2604 (referring to “the interlocking nature of these constitutional  
safeguards”). 
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with the Court’s own analysis and provides the most secure justifica-
tion for the Court’s holding.  One line of precedents had established 
the right to marry as a fundamental right.24  Another line had, step by 
step, eroded any possible argument that disapproval of gay and lesbian 
relationships could justify a law.25  Those precedents did not compel 
the conclusion that states had to allow same-sex marriage, but they 
certainly permitted that conclusion; indeed, they pointed toward it.  
Moreover, decisions in the lower courts generally favored a right to 
same-sex marriage.26  Faced with precedent that left it room to ma-
neuver, the Court chose the course that seemed to it to be morally 
preferable.  This kind of approach — extending precedent in the direc-
tion that seems to make more sense as a matter of morality or good 
policy — is characteristic of the common law.27 
The principal dissent in Obergefell, by Chief Justice Roberts (joined 
by Justices Scalia and Thomas), also operated within an essentially 
common law–like frame.  Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that 
“[t]here is no serious dispute that, under our precedents, the Constitu-
tion protects a right to marry”28 — even though, as he later remarked, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987) (holding that prisoners have a constitutionally 
protected right to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating bans on interra-
cial unions). 
 25 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding Texas’s sodomy law unconsti-
tutional); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (invalidating an amendment to the  
Colorado Constitution that prohibited government protection of gays and lesbians). 
 26 See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 
2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 
2014). 
 27 See, for example, Justice Cardozo’s classic discussion of the common law approach:  
One principle or precedent, pushed to the limit of its logic, may point to one conclusion; 
another principle or precedent, followed with like logic, may point with equal certainty 
to another.  In this conflict, we must choose between the two paths, selecting one or oth-
er, or perhaps striking out upon a third . . . . One path [is] followed, another closed, be-
cause of the conviction in the judicial mind that the one selected led to justice.  Analo-
gies and precedents and the principles behind them were brought together as rivals for 
precedence; in the end, the principle that was thought to be most fundamental, to repre-
sent the larger and deeper social interests, put its competitors to flight. . . . We go for-
ward with our logic, with our analogies, with our philosophies, till we reach a certain 
point.  At first, we have no trouble with the paths; they follow the same lines.  Then 
they begin to diverge, and we must make a choice between them.  History or custom or 
social utility or some compelling sentiment of justice or sometimes perhaps a semi-
intuitive apprehension of the pervading spirit of our law, must come to the rescue . . . . 
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 40–43 (1921). 
  In constitutional law as well, this idea is, I believe, accepted as common sense among reflec-
tive lawyers.  See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term — Foreword: Constitution-
al Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 98 (1966) (“A chief 
responsibility of counsel in constitutional litigation is to aid the Court in that mysterious process 
by which decisions meet new needs yet are shown to have the legal roots needed to maintain the 
rule of law.”). 
 28 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
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“[t]he Constitution itself says nothing about marriage.”29  The dissent’s 
main argument was that the “core definition of marriage” is “the union 
of a man and a woman,” and that none of the Court’s previous deci-
sions had challenged that definition.30  The dissent said that any such 
revision of this traditional understanding of marriage should be made 
by the political process, not by the courts,31 and argued that the major-
ity had ignored the lessons of the era identified with Lochner v. New 
York32 by imposing its own views on the nation.33  The reference to 
Lochner invoked a kind of anti-precedent: a decision that has been so 
thoroughly repudiated that you can discredit your opponent’s position 
by associating it with that decision.34  When it came to the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the dissent’s central criticism of the majority was that 
the majority had not taken “casebook doctrine” — that is, principles 
derived from the Court’s precedents — seriously.35  So even in the dis-
sent, the recognized sources of law were precedent, tradition, and gen-
eral principles derived from those sources. 
As unusual as Obergefell was in other ways, its common law–like 
character is entirely typical.  In the modal Supreme Court constitu-
tional decision, the text of the Constitution plays no real role at all.  
The usual pattern is for the text to be cited early in the Court’s analy-
sis — “the First Amendment provides . . .” — after which the text, 
having served its ceremonial role, bows out, and the serious analysis 
focuses on the precedents.  This was the pattern last Term, as it is ev-
ery Term.  In Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc.36 — which held that the First Amendment does not prevent Texas 
from refusing to issue a vanity license plate with a Confederate flag on 
it37 — the Court did not even recite the First Amendment.  It proceed-
ed directly to its precedents.38  No one, it’s fair to say, raised an eye-
brow about that aspect of the opinion.  The text of the First Amend-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 29 Id. at 2613. 
 30 Id. at 2619.  
 31 See id. at 2624–25. 
 32 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 33 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (referring to “the debacle of the 
Lochner era”). 
 34 See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007) (char-
acterizing Lochner as “the great anti-precedent stigmatizing an entire era of constitutional law”).  
See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) (discussing “the pres-
ence of the anticanon within our constitutional discourse,” id. at 382). 
 35 See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Absent from [the Equal Pro-
tection] portion of the [majority] opinion, however, is anything resembling our usual framework 
for deciding equal protection cases.”).  
 36 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
 37 Id. at 2253. 
 38 See id. at 2245. 
  
2015] THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD 9 
ment got only a ceremonial mention in Reed v. Gilbert;39 the same was 
true of the Fourth Amendment in City of Los Angeles v. Patel,40 the 
Takings Clause in Horne v. Department of Agriculture,41 and the Sixth 
Amendment in Ohio v. Clark.42  Clark is especially notable because 
Crawford v. Washington,43 an earlier decision interpreting the Confron-
tation Clause of the Sixth Amendment (the provision at issue in Clark), 
had purported to rely more closely on the text of that clause.44  But the 
Court in Clark followed the usual pattern — a quotation of the text of 
the clause, followed immediately by an extensive discussion of  
the precedents.45  Justice Scalia, the author of Crawford, protested  
vehemently.46 
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission47 looked like a case in which the text might be central.  
The constitutional issue was whether Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of 
the Constitution forbade Arizona from using a commission, established 
by popular ballot initiative, to draw congressional district lines.48  
That clause says, in part, that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed 
in each State by the Legislature thereof.”49  The Court ruled that the 
people of Arizona, acting through the initiative, constituted the “Legis-
lature” for purposes of that clause.50  A case that addressed the mean-
ing of a word in the Constitution in such a specific way — and that 
presented an issue that had not generated a substantial body of prece-
dent — seemed like one in which a close reading of the text would be 
center stage. 
The principal dissent, again by Chief Justice Roberts, did empha-
size the text.  Chief Justice Roberts identified all the places in the text 
of the Constitution in which the term “Legislature” appeared.51  
“When seeking to discern the meaning of a word in the Constitution, 
there is no better dictionary than the rest of the Constitution itself.”52  
The dissent argued that in every other instance, the clear reference 
was to a representative body; often it could not possibly be to the peo-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 39 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015); see id. at 2226. 
 40 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015); see id. at 2451–52. 
 41 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015); see id. at 2426. 
 42 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015); see id. at 2179. 
 43 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 44 See, e.g., id. at 51. 
 45 135 S. Ct. at 2179–81. 
 46 See id. at 2184–85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 47 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). 
 48 See id. at 2658–59. 
 49 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 50 See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 51 See id. at 2680–81 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 52 Id. at 2680. 
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ple as a whole.53  Chief Justice Roberts’s pièce de résistance was the 
Seventeenth Amendment, which provides that Senators are elected by 
“the people” of each state,54 instead of by “the Legislature,” as the orig-
inal Constitution had prescribed.55  The Seventeenth Amendment was 
unnecessary if the term “the Legislature” in the original Constitution 
could have been understood simply to mean the electorate as a 
whole.56 
But that was the dissent.  The opinion of the Court relied not on 
the text but on precedents,57 and it invoked a variety of policy argu-
ments to justify its result: concern with “the problem of partisan ger-
rymandering,” which the independent commission was designed to 
solve,58 as well as the values of popular sovereignty59 and federalism.60  
The Chief Justice’s dissent tartly criticized the majority for this: “The 
majority begins by discussing policy.  I begin with the Constitution.”61  
But in fact the majority’s approach — relying on precedents and poli-
cy arguments to reach a conclusion that may or may not be the most 
straightforward reading of the text — is characteristic of U.S. constitu-
tional law. 
In particular, the Court in Arizona State Legislature used three 
precedents to try to show that there was a way to read the Constitu-
tion that allowed the use of the initiative in redistricting.62  In one of 
those earlier cases, the Court allowed a referendum to overturn a dis-
tricting plan enacted by the state legislature (although not to replace it 
with a new one);63 in another, the Court allowed a governor to veto the 
legislature’s districting plan.64  The majority relied on those cases to 
conclude that “the Legislature” in Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 could 
include more than just the legislative branch of the state government 
and could, in the case of the referendum, include the population as  
a whole.65  The third precedent, Hawke v. Smith (No. 1),66 held that  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 53 Id. at 2680–81. 
 54 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1. 
 55 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.  
 56 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2677–78 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 57 See id. at 2666 (majority opinion) (“Before focusing directly on the statute and constitutional 
prescriptions in point, we summarize this Court’s precedent relating to appropriate state 
decisionmakers for redistricting purposes.”).  
 58 Id. at 2658.  
 59 Id. at 2671 (“[T]he animating principle of our Constitution [is] that the people themselves 
are the originating source of all the powers of government.”). 
 60 Id. at 2673 (“[I]t is characteristic of our federal system that States retain autonomy to estab-
lish their own governmental processes.”). 
 61 Id. at 2678 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 62 See id. at 2666–67 (majority opinion). 
 63 See Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916). 
 64 See Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). 
 65 See Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2668. 
 66 253 U.S. 221 (1920).  
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Article V, which prescribes the process by which the Constitution is 
amended, allowed only states’ legislative bodies to participate in the 
ratification of a proposed amendment.67  But, the Arizona State Legis-
lature majority said, the Court in Hawke v. Smith had distinguished 
between the “ratifying function,”68 which Article V vested exclusively 
in the legislature, and “the ordinary business of legislation.”69  That 
distinction enabled the Arizona State Legislature majority to say that 
districting, being part of the ordinary business of legislation, was not a 
power limited to the legislative body alone.70 
The Arizona State Legislature majority also mentioned many other 
provisions of various states’ laws, adopted by popular vote without the 
legislature’s involvement, that affected the “‘Times, Places and Man-
ner’ of holding federal elections” — such as provisions in popularly 
adopted state constitutions dealing with voter registration, vote count-
ing, primary elections, absentee voting, and secret ballots.71  The dis-
sent’s approach, the Court said, would call those provisions into  
question.72 
Arizona State Legislature suggests several things about the role of 
the text.  Despite the dominance of precedent in many areas of consti-
tutional law, it remains true that appeals to straightforward textual ar-
guments, like those made by the Chief Justice, can be powerful.  But, 
as I said, Arizona State Legislature was a case in which textual argu-
ments were likely to play an important role, because of the relative 
lack of precedent.  The Court did not have anything like the extensive 
body of precedent it has in a First or Fourth Amendment case.  And 
despite that, the textual argument did not prevail. 
The majority opinion relied instead on the typical elements of the 
common law — the Court’s precedents and various policy judgments.  
The majority also relied, in a way, on what might be considered 
nonjudicial precedent — the general acceptance of the many provi-
sions of state law that might have been endangered by a narrow defi-
nition of “Legislature.”  Finally, the way the majority dealt with the 
text is revealing.  Rather than argue, as the dissent did, that it was 
reading the text in the single best way,73 the majority just tried to 
show that it was possible to read the text in a way that accommodated 
the majority’s result.74  One could read “Legislature” to mean different 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 67 See id. at 225, 231.  
 68 Ariz. State Legislature, 135 S. Ct. at 2667. 
 69 Id. (quoting Hawke, 253 U.S. at 229).  
 70 See id. at 2668. 
 71 See id. at 2676 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). 
 72 Id. at 2676–77. 
 73 See id. at 2677–82 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 74 See id. at 2667–68 (majority opinion).  
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things in different provisions, depending on what function the various 
provisions assigned to the legislature.75 
This approach to the text — finding a way to make the text con-
sistent with an outcome that is reached for other reasons — is often 
the response to the anomalies I have identified: there is a way to read 
the text to eliminate the anomaly, even if that is not the most obvious 
or straightforward way to read the text.  This, of course, just adds to 
the puzzle about the role of the text.  It seems to be an oddly interme-
diate position.  We find some way to reconcile with the text a result 
that is actually dictated by precedent and policy, instead of either fol-
lowing the most straightforward reading of the text or openly treating 
the Constitution as a source of inspiration but not a legally binding 
document.  Why is this way of dealing with the text characteristic of 
our constitutional law?  
* * * 
As these various examples suggest, the text of the Constitution rou-
tinely plays only a token role in litigated cases, although text-based ar-
guments are occasionally influential.  At the same time, as I will dis-
cuss, some issues are so conclusively settled by the text that they are 
never litigated.  Also, it seems that explicitly ignoring the text is never 
acceptable.  Courts make it a point to try to reconcile their results with 
the text, even if that means reading the text in a way that is not 
straightforward or obvious.76  And some established principles are 
simply inconsistent with the text.  
As if that were not enough, there is another layer to the puzzle.  In 
ordinary statutory cases, these days at least, the Court emphasizes the 
exact wording of the text, often to the exclusion of everything else.77  
In constitutional cases, if I am right, the text is often all but ignored 
and sometimes even contradicted.  What are we to make of that dra-
matic difference? 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 75 Id. 
 76 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional 
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 709 (2011) (“[O]ur commitment to the text creates a discur-
sive requirement that all constitutional norms and arguments be couched as ‘interpretations’ of 
the big-C Constitution.”).  
 77 See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 950 (2009) (“Because the statutory language is 
clear, there is no need to reach petitioner’s remaining arguments based on statutory purpose, legis-
lative history, or the rule of lenity.”); see also Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2242 (2010) 
(“When the statutory language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at least where the dispo-
sition required by the text is not absurd — is to enforce it according to its terms.” (quoting  
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006))); John F. Manning, 
The Supreme Court, 2013 Term — Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 22–29 (2014). 
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In a word, U.S. constitutional law is not a text-based system but a 
mixed system, composed of both text and precedent.78  The building 
blocks of constitutional law are those two familiar things; there is no 
need for recourse, as is sometimes made, to more mystical claims about 
the enduring values of the American people or anything like that.  
Constitutional law should resemble other familiar forms of law, like 
common law and law derived from an authoritative text — forms of 
law that have been around for centuries and are present in other na-
tions as well.  And, in fact, statutory interpretation, despite the empha-
sis on the language of the text in recent cases, is also a mixed system, 
consisting of both text and common law, although the mixture is dif-
ferent.  The problem is to figure out what one can say about such 
mixed systems in a way that helps explain and, potentially, justify their 
features. 
In Part II, I will explain why it is important to recognize that 
American constitutional law is a mixed system, not a text-based sys-
tem.  As I have suggested, seeing constitutional law as a mixed system 
draws into question the familiar notion that constitutional law is de-
rived, in a direct way, from the text.  As a corollary, constitutional 
fundamentalism — the idea that the text is the ultimate source of law 
and that precedents have a second-tier status and can always be chal-
lenged as being inconsistent with the text — is mistaken.  Moreover, 
similar mixed systems are common, even when it comes to areas gov-
erned by statute; constitutional law is not exceptional in this respect. 
In Part III, I will discuss the anomalies and defend the claim that 
these are, in fact, instances in which well-established principles of con-
stitutional law are inconsistent with the text of the Constitution.  Fi-
nally, in Part IV, I will suggest some implications that may extend be-
yond constitutional law.  In particular, I will suggest that our practices, 
in constitutional law and perhaps more generally, can be justified as 
accommodating three institutional interests — interests in what might 
be called sovereignty, adaptation, and settlement.  Understanding con-
stitutional law as that kind of accommodation can help define the role 
the text plays in constitutional law and solve some of the puzzles of 
our current system.  That view of constitutional law is better than see-
ing constitutional law as a matter of “interpreting” the Constitution in 
any ordinary sense. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 78 This point has, of course, been made in various forms by others.  For two important exam-
ples, see Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934); and 
Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975). 
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II.  THE MIXED SYSTEM 
A.  The Origins of the Mixed System 
The Constitution is an old document, and it is very hard to amend.  
For these reasons alone, it should not be surprising that the text is not 
central and that some established principles are even inconsistent with 
it.  But there is a more general point.  We do not always follow the 
original understandings of constitutional provisions — that is, the un-
derstandings, held at the time that a provision was adopted, about 
how it would be applied.  There are well-known examples in which 
following the original understandings of various vague provisions 
would require us to abandon settled constitutional principles.79  
We should expect that some unacceptable original understandings 
were also stated explicitly in the text.  So just as we have to discard 
original understandings sometimes, we should expect to have trouble 
following the text sometimes.  In a way, the surprising thing is that 
there are not more anomalies like the ones I listed.  The drafters of the 
Constitution and its amendments deserve credit for many things, but 
one of their accomplishments that may not be sufficiently recognized is 
that they drafted many provisions that have enough flexibility to allow 
us to read them in ways that accommodate our current understandings. 
An easier amendment process would undoubtedly reduce —  
although, just as undoubtedly, not eliminate — the extent to which 
common law processes are used to adapt the Constitution to new cir-
cumstances.  But at first glance it does seem surprising that the exist-
ing amendment process, specified in Article V, has not at least removed 
the anomalies — instances in which the text seems inconsistent with 
principles that almost everyone accepts.  The very fact that the princi-
ples are well established should mean that there would be no problem 
in rallying support for an amendment.  But instead our system has 
found other ways to adapt.  
That itself is revealing.  Part of the reason that anomalies persist 
may be that the now-established principles emerged slowly, so there 
was no single decisive moment at which the conflict between the text 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 79 See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 15–16 
(2001); STRAUSS, supra note 13, at 12–17; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES 63–65 
(2005); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 
221 (1980).  Even people sympathetic to originalism are prepared to accept some decisions that, 
they acknowledge, might be questioned on originalist grounds.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, 
Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
2387, 2417 (2006) (book review) (mentioning “protection against sex discrimination under the 
Equal Protection Clause, application of the Equal Protection Clause to the federal government, 
expansion of the Commerce Clause to permit federal regulation of intrastate commercial activity, 
[and] prohibition of gross malapportionment of state legislative districts”). 
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and the principles became too stark to ignore.  For example, people 
gradually got accustomed to the idea that there should be no estab-
lished churches in the states and to the steady expansion of the fran-
chise, and reading those principles back into the Constitution seemed 
natural because the principles seemed natural.  If this is so, it suggests 
that an evolutionary process, rather than decisive interventions, is the 
normal way in which we should expect constitutional law to change.  
Formal amendments are just not that important. 
In general, one would expect a well-functioning system to develop 
ways to work around features that are anachronistic or otherwise in-
adequate but costly to fix.  Institutions do not exist on paper; they exist 
in people’s practices and understandings.  Those practices and under-
standings will develop over time, and if what’s written on paper is too 
hard to change, people will ignore what’s on the paper or just read it 
in a way that makes it conform to the understandings.  Once that 
happens, undertaking a difficult amendment process is not worth it.  
There is little to be gained from trying to amend the Constitution if the 
understandings are already secure.  And there might be something to 
be lost, if the amendment fails because the process is so demanding — 
thereby potentially undermining the settled understanding — or if the 
effort to amend the Constitution in one uncontroversial respect spirals 
away into something ill-advised.80  The fact that we have not resorted 
to amendments, but have instead just made our peace with the anoma-
lies (or, rather, barely noticed them), is evidence that, in general, the 
amendment process is not as important a means of changing the Con-
stitution as one might think.81 
In all of these ways, constitutional law seems to work well enough 
despite the general lack of clarity about the precise role of the text and 
despite the anomalies in particular.  No one seriously says that the 
President can disregard the First Amendment and selectively prosecute 
his political opponents, or that the federal government can operate ra-
cially segregated facilities, or that states can disenfranchise gays.  But 
these issues about the role of the text are significant for more subtle 
reasons.  They affect how we think about constitutional law in ways 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 President Franklin Roosevelt, for example, decided against seeking a constitutional amend-
ment either to authorize New Deal legislation explicitly or to limit the Court’s power to review 
congressional legislation.  He was deterred by both the difficulty of amendment and the risk that 
seeking an amendment would end up backfiring — either because the rejection of a proposed 
amendment would prove politically harmful, or because of the difficulty of drafting language that 
would achieve what he wanted without being subject to hostile interpretation.  For discussion, 
see, for example, DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995 ch. 13 (1996); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME 
COURT REBORN 91–96 (1995).    
 81 For an argument to this effect, see generally David A. Strauss, Commentary, The Irrele-
vance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457 (2001).  
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that might have a practical impact.  Beyond that, these issues in con-
stitutional law may suggest something more far-reaching and funda-
mental about other areas of the law. 
B.  Does Constitutional Law Begin with the Text? 
Instinctively, we think of constitutional law as starting with the 
text of the Constitution and proceeding from there.  We say that con-
stitutional law is a matter of interpreting the Constitution’s language,82 
or discerning the meaning of its provisions,83 or implementing the 
Constitution.84 
One problem with this assumption is that, as I’ve said, constitu-
tional litigation — unlike litigation about ordinary statutes — general-
ly does not actually pay much attention to the text.  Arizona State Leg-
islature and Noel Canning were unusual cases just because a close 
reading of the text featured so prominently.  And in those cases, there 
were few (in Noel Canning, no) directly relevant Supreme Court pre-
cedents.85  As it happens, in both cases, a good argument can be made 
that the Court’s decision allowed the most natural reading of the text 
to be defeated, in part because of nonjudicial precedent.86  But the 
main point is that those decisions were exceptional among litigated 
cases because the text actually did play some role.  Precedent-based, 
common law–like constitutional law — which is most of constitutional 
law — does not seem to be generated by the text or derived from the 
text in any obvious way.  Obergefell makes this clear, but even in more 
typical cases, one simply cannot derive the elaborate doctrine that is 
constitutional law from the spare words of the text in any direct way.  
Those words could have generated very different bodies of doctrine. 
To be clear, it is easy to identify instances in which the text is very 
important.  As I will discuss, important parts of the basic structure of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 82 See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37–41 (1997).  
 83 One recurrent theme distinguishes between constitutional “interpretation,” which discerns 
the “meaning” (or, it is often said, the “semantic meaning”) of a constitutional provision, and “con-
struction,” which identifies principles of constitutional law when interpretation does not settle 
them.  For examples, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3–16 (2011); RANDY E. 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION 89–131 (rev. ed. 2014); KEITH E. 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1–16 (1999); Lawrence B. Solum, Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940–55 (2009); Lawrence B. 
Solum, Semantic Originalism 1–10 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Papers Series, Paper 
No. 07-24, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [http://perma.cc/NG4T-N7TC].  
 84 FALLON, supra note 79, at 37–44; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term — 
Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54 (1997). 
 85 See Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2666 
(2015) (“Three decisions compose the relevant case law . . . .”); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 
2550, 2560 (2014) (“We have not previously interpreted the [Recess Appointments] Clause . . . .”).   
 86 See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual 
Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46–49.   
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the federal government seem entirely settled by the text, for example.87  
That is part of the puzzle.  But in controversial areas the text all but 
disappears.  In fact, the anomalies suggest that there are important 
domains of constitutional law in which the common law — the prece-
dents and the policies — comes first, and the text follows.  
In other words, the precedents shape the text, rather than the other 
way around.88  This is apparent in the case of the anomalies, but the 
anomalies identify a more general feature of U.S. constitutional law.  
The reason it is unthinkable to say that the Constitution permits the 
President to abridge the freedom of speech is that our law has devel-
oped in a way that makes it unthinkable.  For that matter, the words 
alone do not make it unthinkable that people could be put in jail for 
criticizing the government — Blackstone famously said that “liberty of 
the press, properly understood . . . consists in laying no previous re-
straints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for crimi-
nal matter when published.”89  The text of the First Amendment did 
not dictate how what we think of as “the First Amendment” — that is, 
the constitutional law of freedom of expression — has developed; the 
developments in the law have dictated our “interpretation” of the text.  
That is why it matters that our settled understandings of the Equal 
Protection Clause, while not obviously inconsistent with the language 
of the text, do not follow from the way we would read that language if 
it were, say, in a statute: it suggests that those understandings have 
developed for reasons independent of the language in the text.90  
We routinely read principles we have developed for other reasons 
back into the text.  When we think about what the First Amendment, 
or the Commerce Clause, or the Due Process Clause “means,” we think 
of the cases and nonjudicial practices that have developed the law in 
the areas identified with those provisions.  And then, as in Obergefell, 
the majestic language of those clauses is invoked in support of those 
principles.  That is why the usual image of constitutional law — begin 
with the text, and go from there — is often inaccurate. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 For a criticism of these “hard-wired” provisions of the Constitution, see SANFORD 
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 25–77 (2006).    
 88 For an important statement of the position that the text of the Constitution takes its mean-
ing from other sources (not limited to precedent), see Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Con-
structed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 DUKE L.J. 1213, 1216–17 (2015) (arguing that 
“perceived [textual] clarity” can hinge on “a variety of other considerations,” id. at 1216, including 
conclusions about purpose, structure, national ethos, consequences, practice, and precedent).   
 89 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151; see also id. at *151–52. 
 90 See, e.g., Bradley & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1273 (“[E]xtratextual considerations can also be 
important in determining which portions of text are clear and which are unclear.”). 
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C.  The Rejection of Fundamentalism 
A more specific implication of the claim that constitutional law is 
not text-centered is that the principle suggested by Justice Scalia’s 
question in Noel Canning — that the text always has priority over 
even well-established practices — should be rejected.  Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Noel Canning, and (to an even greater degree) the D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion, flirted with what might be called constitutional fun-
damentalism.91  The dissent in Arizona State Legislature, although it 
did address the precedents, emphasized the text more heavily and had 
a fundamentalist tone.92  Fundamentalism, here as in other settings, 
treats the foundational text as the only ultimate authority.  Only a nar-
row range of interpretations and implementations is permitted; devia-
tions from the text are forbidden. 
Over time, in the fundamentalist vision, the law might have drifted 
away from its foundations.  But to the extent it has done so, it is erro-
neous and possibly corrupt.  Therefore, on the fundamentalist view, it 
is always acceptable, in fact presumptively mandatory, to return to the 
text, even if that means rejecting precedents and practices that have 
come to be taken for granted, and even if those practices have existed 
for a long time.  There might be some room for a pragmatic compro-
mise with longstanding practices and precedents, but in principle the 
text is the law and precedents that deviate from it should be rejected. 
Fundamentalism in this sense — in which the text is always the ul-
timate authority — is different from originalism, the view that the 
original understanding of a constitutional provision, somehow defined, 
controls.93  These two views share the premise that certain decisions, 
made at the time a constitutional provision was adopted, must be fol-
lowed until that provision is formally amended.  But, as I said, 
originalism has well-known vulnerabilities.  As a result, departures 
from the original understandings are acceptable in a way that depar-
tures from the text seem not to be.  Again, Obergefell is an example, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 91 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2594 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (discussing the Court’s “duty to interpret the Constitution in light of its text, structure, 
and original understanding”); Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“When 
interpreting a constitutional provision, we must look to the natural meaning of the text as it 
would have been understood at the time of the ratification of the Constitution.”), aff’d on other 
grounds, 134 S. Ct. 2550. 
 92 See, e.g., Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 
2677–80 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for having “no basis in 
the text, structure, or history of the Constitution,” although also asserting that the opinion “con-
tradicts precedents from both Congress and this Court,” id. at 2678). 
 93 See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 83, at 4; SCALIA, supra note 82, at 23–25.  For a criticism of 
the related form of fundamentalism — the form that rejects established principles of constitu-
tional law in order to revert to the original understandings of constitutional provisions — see 
SUNSTEIN, supra note 79, at 25–27, 30–38.  
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although very far from the only one, of how the text and the original 
understandings are treated differently.  The opinion of the Court in 
Obergefell did not make any attempt to argue that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, when adopted, was understood to create a right to same-
sex marriage, and of course such an argument would not have been 
plausible.  But the text is not explicitly ignored or brushed aside in 
that way.  That is why the anomalies are notable, and that is why text-
based fundamentalism retains some appeal.94 
The Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,95 
which held that the District’s gun control ordinance violated the Sec-
ond Amendment, is probably the most fundamentalist decision in re-
cent times.  The Court announced, “[w]e turn first to the meaning of 
the Second Amendment.”96  The Court then examined the text in great 
detail.97  The opinion examined historical materials, but it insisted that 
in doing so it was just shedding light on the “meaning” of the text.98  
Only after its inquiry into meaning did the Court “ask whether any of 
our precedents forecloses the conclusions we have reached about the 
meaning of the Second Amendment.”99 
Fundamentalism seems most appealing to the courts in cases in 
which there are not a lot of judicial precedents — cases like Heller, 
Noel Canning, and Arizona State Legislature — which is revealing: it 
is further evidence that the primary source of constitutional law is 
precedent, because the text becomes decisive only, it seems, when there 
are no precedents to draw on.  As I suggested earlier, it is as if the text 
has the status of an old precedent — it is decisive if, but only if, there 
is nothing more recent.  But that is not the way fundamentalist opin-
ions are written, and it is not the conventional way of thinking about 
the Constitution. 
As an aside, even if you treat the text as a backstop to be used only 
when the Supreme Court has not addressed an issue, there would still 
be a problem with Heller, and with the dissent in Arizona State  
Legislature and the concurrence and lower court opinion in Noel  
Canning.  The problem is that these opinions arguably slight the role 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 94 Fundamentalism is also well represented in the literature.  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 
83; Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23 
(1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. 
COMMENT. 289 (2005); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 1005 (2011); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1209 (2010) [hereinafter Rosenkranz, Subjects].  
 95 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 96 Id. at 576. 
 97 See id. at 576–605. 
 98 See, e.g., id. at 584. 
 99 Id. at 619. 
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of nonjudicial precedent.100  Nonjudicial precedents — the practices of 
the executive and legislative branches, for example, or (in Arizona 
State Legislature) the state election laws adopted by popular vote — 
can be harder to work with than judicial precedent is, but many of the 
arguments for adhering to judicial precedent apply at least as strongly 
to the nonjudicial kind.101  In addition, one form of nonjudicial prece-
dent is the absence of litigation: for decades, so far as we can tell, few 
of the many people convicted of violating laws restricting firearms,  
few of the many firms subject to regulation by recess appointees, and 
few of those affected by popularly adopted regulations of congressional 
elections raised constitutional claims.  You have to be careful in draw-
ing conclusions from that, but the absence of litigation might suggest a 
consensus that should be given more weight than even a solid line of 
judicial precedent in an actively litigated, and therefore more contro-
versial, area of the law.102  
The deeper problem, though, is with the fundamentalist premise 
that the true Constitution is the text and the precedents are secondary 
at best.  That premise, if followed consistently, would overturn many 
settled and important principles of constitutional law — that is the 
significance of the anomalies.  For this reason, fundamentalism is very 
much the exception, not the rule.  Even the Heller Court, in the most 
fundamentalist majority opinion in recent years, could not maintain its 
fundamentalism consistently.  Among other things, it went out of its 
way to say that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on” many “longstanding prohibitions” — such as laws forbidding fel-
ons or mentally ill individuals from possessing firearms, or laws  
barring firearms from “sensitive places such as schools and govern-
ment buildings.”103  The Court gave no explanation for how these ex-
ceptions fit with the “meaning of the Second Amendment” that it had 
so painstakingly analyzed.104  But these exceptions are sensible, and 
they are “longstanding” — the hallmarks of the common law, not of 
fundamentalism. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 100 See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT ch. 4 (2008). 
 101 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Constitutional Fundamentalism and the Separation of Powers: 
The Recess Appointments Case, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 360–64 (2014).  
 102 Cf. Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404; 10 M. & W. 109, 114 (“If there 
had been any ground for such an action, there certainly would have been some precedent of it; 
but with [certain] exception[s] . . . no case of a similar nature has occurred in practice.”).  
 103 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
 104 For criticism of this aspect of the Heller opinion, by a self-described originalist, see Nelson 
Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 
1356–67 (2009). 
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D.  Making Sense of a Mixed System 
It would be straightforward to dismiss fundamentalism, and to be 
untroubled by the ways in which constitutional law seems at odds with 
the text, if constitutional law consisted exclusively of precedents.  In 
the ordinary constitutional case, as I said,105 the arguments and the 
analysis focus on precedents and on concerns of fairness and good pol-
icy, and the text plays hardly any role.  If all of constitutional law were 
like that, we could just treat the text of the Constitution as a source of 
guidance and inspiration, like the Declaration of Independence, and 
view constitutional law as an entirely precedent-based system, as if we 
had no written constitution at all.106 
But it is very clear that we do not treat the Constitution that way.  
In our legal system, it is not acceptable explicitly to ignore the text of 
the Constitution — that is why the anomalies I mentioned earlier fly 
under the radar and are generally unacknowledged.  Any claim about 
constitutional law has to be connected to the text in some way, howev-
er contrived.  The ceremonial mentions of the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses in Obergefell are examples.107  You can also never 
say, for example, that a provision is obsolete and should be “overruled” 
in the way a court might overrule an obsolete precedent.  In addition, 
some features of our system that do derive from the text — such as 
those that determine the composition of Congress108 and the respective 
roles of Congress and the President in legislating109 — are not only 
very important, but also very difficult to change through common 
law–like means, apparently precisely because they are in the text. 
For example, the Supreme Court used the principle of “one person, 
one vote” to mandate fundamental changes in the government of every 
state, even though that principle is not explicit in the Constitution.110  
But it would never occur to the Court to order that the United States 
Senate be reconstituted according to that principle.  The natural ex-
planation is that the composition of the Senate is written into the Con-
stitution.111  But mandating “one person, one vote” for state legisla-
tures is, as far as anyone can tell, every bit as inconsistent with the 
original understandings as mandating it for the Senate would be.  It 
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 105 See supra pp. 8–9.  
 106 For an argument that no other view of the text of the Constitution is defensible, see LOUIS 
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE 15–21 (2012).  
 107 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (discussing the Due Process Clause); 
id. at 2602–03 (discussing the Equal Protection Clause). 
 108 See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1–3. 
 109 See id. § 7, cl. 2. 
 110 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 
(1963)). 
 111 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
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just happens that the original understandings about the Senate were 
written into the document, and the original understandings that per-
mitted malapportioned state legislatures were not stated explicitly.  
But why should that make any difference, if we know what the origi-
nal understandings were?  Somehow, the fact that one norm is explicit 
in the text seems to matter even if we know that the other norm was 
taken for granted when the text was written. 
This is not to say that even the explicit norm is immutable.  One 
could imagine an evolutionary, common law–like change in the fea-
tures of our system that are explicit in the text — for example, one 
could imagine the Senate evolving to be more like the British House of 
Lords, which plays a very limited role in legislating.112  The norms 
governing the election of the President have evolved in roughly the 
same way: the settled practice can be squared with the text, but the 
practice is different from what the text seems to contemplate.113  So in 
that sense the text does not fix the constitutional order permanently.  
But there is no question that the bare fact that the provisions about 
the Senate are in the text makes a difference. 
The overall picture, then, is that the text retains an ultimate au-
thority, both nominal (in the sense that all constitutional principles 
must be formally linked to the text in some way) and real (in the sense 
that some key elements of our system are attributable primarily or ex-
clusively to the text).  But at the same time, constitutional law routine-
ly proceeds without regard to the text, in a common law–like fashion.  
And if I am right about the anomalies, the force of the common law–
like elements is so strong that in important categories of cases it even 
sweeps aside the text. 
E.  Are Mixed Systems Ubiquitous?  
Against Constitutional Law Exceptionalism 
This kind of mixed system may actually be the norm.  That is, con-
stitutional law may not be distinctive in this respect.  Many areas of 
the law that we think of as being governed by authoritative texts 
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 112 See, e.g., ANTHONY KING, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 299 (2007) (discussing the 
Salisbury Convention, according to which the House of Lords will not impede the passage of leg-
islation adopted by the House of Commons if the legislation was prefigured in the election mani-
festo of the majority party in the Commons). 
 113 See, e.g., Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952) (upholding a state law authorizing political 
parties to require presidential electors to take an oath that they will support the candidate chosen 
by the party convention); id. at 232 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“No one faithful to our history can 
deny that the plan originally contemplated, what is implicit in its text, that electors would be free 
agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan judgment as to the men best qualified for the 
Nation’s highest offices.”); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME 
COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888–1986, at 371 (1990) (describing Justice Jackson’s argu-
ment as “unimpeachabl[e]”). 
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might, in fact, present the same challenge of reconciling textual and 
precedent-based elements.  Ordinarily, for example, we think there is a 
clear priority rule governing the relationship between statutes and the 
common law: the common law operates only when there is no statute 
in the picture.  If there is a statute, the statute governs to the exclusion 
of nonstatutory precedent.  But there is an older tradition — one that 
seems foreign to us today — that puts statutes and the common law 
more on a par, so that the text of the statute must be harmonized with 
principles generated by the common law.114 
For example, in 1936, Harlan Fiske Stone, then an Associate Jus-
tice, described “the ideal of a unified system of judge-made and statute 
law woven into a seamless whole by the processes of adjudication.”115  
Statutes should be treated “as starting points for judicial lawmaking 
comparable to judicial decisions.”116  Justice Stone saw this as a matter 
not of exalting precedent but, on the contrary, of giving statutes great-
er influence — more influence than their text alone would require.  
“[T]he common-law courts,”117 he wrote, “have long recognized the su-
premacy of statutes over judge-made law, but it has been the suprema-
cy of a command to be obeyed according to its letter, to be treated as 
otherwise of little consequence.”118  Instead, statutes should be “re-
garded . . . as a point of departure for the process of judicial reasoning 
by which the common law has been expanded.”119  Courts “have done 
practically that with our ancient statutes, such as the statutes of limita-
tions, frauds and wills, readily molding them to fit new conditions 
within their spirit, though not their letter, possibly because their antiq-
uity tends to make us forget or minimize their legislative origin.”120 
Something like that approach — melding the common law with an 
authoritative text — seems to be how we do constitutional law.  What 
Justice Stone suggests about the “ancient statutes” — that judges seem 
to have forgotten to treat them as statutes — sounds like the way in 
which we have more or less forgotten what various provisions of the 
Constitution say and have integrated those provisions into a precedent-
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 114 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1908); 
Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1936).  For a mod-
ern statement along similar lines, see Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and 
Common Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429, 436–37.  Justice Harlan’s opinion in Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), is an example of this tradition.  See also GUIDO 
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES ch. XII (1982).  I am indebted to 
Thomas Grey for this point. 
 115 Stone, supra note 114, at 12.  
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 12–13. 
 119 Id. at 13. 
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based system.  And, as Justice Stone also suggests,121 that is a good 
thing. 
However well it describes constitutional law, at first glance this ap-
proach seems antithetical to the way statutes are treated today.  One of 
the important developments in recent decades has been an emphasis on 
text in statutory interpretation.  In the typical statutory case — very 
unlike the typical constitutional case — courts focus very closely on the 
words.122  The idea of melding the text with common law, à la Justice 
Stone, seems like, at best, a throwback.  Consider, for example, Milner 
v. Department of the Navy,123 a case from 2011 that illustrates how dis-
cordant Stone’s approach seems today.  In Milner, the government re-
jected a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for information 
about how the Navy stored explosives.124  The court of appeals — rely-
ing on longstanding precedent from the D.C. Circuit125 — ruled in fa-
vor of the government on the basis of Exemption 2 of FOIA,126 which 
allows the government to withhold records “related solely to the inter-
nal personnel rules and practices of an agency.”127 
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals.  The Court did 
not deny that it made sense to allow the Navy to keep those records 
secret,128 and the government’s position had substantial support in ju-
dicial and nonjudicial precedent129 — the kinds of things that would 
matter under a common law approach.  But the Court’s opinion em-
phasized that the language of the exemption — in particular, its use of 
the word “personnel” — simply did not extend to records having to do 
with the safe storage of explosives.130  Perhaps most strikingly, this in-
tense focus on text was barely controversial within the Court.131  The 
opinion was joined by eight Justices, with only Justice Breyer dissent-
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 121 See id. at 25–26. 
 122 See, e.g., Manning, supra note 77, at 22–29. 
 123 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011).  
 124 Id. at 1263–64.  
 125 See Milner v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 575 F.3d 959, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Crooker v. 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 670 F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc)), rev’d, 131 
S. Ct. 1259.  
 126 Id. at 965. 
 127 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2012). 
 128 Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1270–71. 
 129 See id. at 1271 (“[W]e acknowledge that our decision today upsets three decades of agency 
practice . . . .”).  Compare id. at 1274 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the position rejected by 
the majority “has been consistently followed, or favorably cited, by every Court of Appeals to 
have considered the matter during the past 30 years”), with id. at 1268–69 (majority opinion) (re-
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 130 Id. at 1266. 
 131 See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 114, 132–33 (“[T]he 
Court in the last two decades has mostly treated as uncontroversial its duty to adhere strictly to 
the terms of a clear statutory text . . . .”  Id. at 114.). 
  
2015] THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD 25 
ing.  In many ways, Milner is typical of the way the Supreme Court 
approaches statutes today.132  So it looks as if there is a sharp distinc-
tion between constitutional law and statutory interpretation. 
In fact, though, matters are more complicated than that.  As text-
focused as the Court has become in statutory cases, common law ele-
ments are important in many areas of public law that are ostensibly 
governed by statutes.133  For example, two of the central principles of 
administrative law — the Chenery doctrine134 and the form of “hard 
look” review associated with State Farm135 — do not have a clear 
statutory basis and are the product of common law reasoning.136  One 
can reconcile these principles with the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), but they do not follow very obviously from the text of the APA.  
Other principles of administrative law, too, seem to be generated by a 
common law process of learning from experience with the administra-
tive state, responding to changing circumstances, and adapting the 
principles in a way that makes practical sense.137  The principles, ar-
rived at in this way, are then read back into the statutes.  This process 
parallels the way in which, for example, we develop principles of 
equality and nondiscrimination and then read them back into the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
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 132 See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 133 In international law, as well, unwritten law derived from custom coexists with written trea-
ties.  The two have “equal authority as international law.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
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 135 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  For an 
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/VD8E-AZKV].  
 136 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Common Law and Statute Law in Administrative Law, 63 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (2011) (describing how State Farm arose from a common law process 
rather than the APA); John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. 
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Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293 (2012).  For general 
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 137 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 136, at 1300–10, 1312–13.  
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The administrative law counterpart to fundamentalism is the ap-
proach associated with Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.138  In that case, the Court repudi-
ated procedural requirements that had been developed by the lower 
courts in a common law–like way but that went beyond the text of the 
APA.139  The question of when the Vermont Yankee approach will gov-
ern — as opposed to the approach taken in, for example, the hard look 
review cases140 — is analogous to the puzzle about the respective roles 
of text and precedent in constitutional law.141  There does not seem to 
be a clear answer.142 
There are other statutes that, like the APA, coexist with a body  
of common law that cannot easily be inferred from the text.  The 
Sherman Act is a familiar example.143  Section 1983 of Title 42, which 
allows civil actions against state officials for violations of federal con-
stitutional rights, has given rise to an extensive body of judge-made 
doctrine that goes well beyond the terms of the text.144  The attorney’s 
fees provision that accompanies section 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 — a 
statute that is, as a practical matter, very important in public law liti-
gation — has been interpreted in a remarkably countertextual way.145  
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 138 435 U.S. 519 (1978).  
 139 Id. at 539–49. 
 140 See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. 29. 
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Section 1331 of Title 28, which gives federal district courts jurisdiction 
over cases arising under federal law, is the basis for a complex body of 
judge-made law that is designed to advance the apparent purposes of 
the statute while accounting for the practicalities of litigation.146  Sec-
tion 1331 is an especially notable example because, even though its 
language is nearly the same as the grant of federal question jurisdic-
tion in Article III, the two provisions are interpreted quite differently, 
for practical and historical reasons.147  In all of these instances, it 
seems fair to say that courts have treated statutes according to Justice 
Stone’s model. 
Even the domain that seems most clearly governed by authoritative 
texts — complex, detailed regulatory statutes that courts interpret by 
following the text closely — may actually be characterized by the same 
puzzling mix of text-based and common law elements.  But the com-
mon law elements are provided mostly by administrative agencies, not 
the courts.  Chevron and its predecessors148 — cases dealing with the 
deference courts must give to administrative agencies’ interpretations 
of the law — are supposed to dictate how the text of statutes and the 
(somewhat) common law–like processes of agencies coexist.  Nominal-
ly, the rules of their coexistence are simple: if the statute is clear, the 
agency must comply; if the statute is vague, a reasonable agency inter-
pretation will be accepted by the courts.149 
In practice, though, it is not always obvious when a provision is 
clear enough to preclude deference to the agency.150  Even when the 
agency’s action seems to be consistent with the words, the Supreme 
Court might reject what the agency has done because of a settled pat-
tern of understandings to the contrary — a kind of nonjudicial prece-
dent.151  Or the Court might decide — as it did last Term in King v. 
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Burwell,152 the high-profile litigation that threatened the viability of 
the Affordable Care Act — that, while the statute is ambiguous, the 
issue is too important to be left to an agency and should be resolved by 
a court.153  If an agency has consistently adhered to a view that seems 
to be at odds with the text of the statute, that might persuade a court 
to find a degree of vagueness or ambiguity in the text that the court 
would otherwise not perceive and to defer to the agency’s longstanding 
view.154  And then there are the questions about what kind of agency 
actions are entitled to deference, and to what degree.155 
The puzzle of when, exactly, Chevron requires deference is again 
analogous to the puzzle of how text and precedent coexist in constitu-
tional law.  Obviously the analogy is, for many reasons, not exact: 
statutes are easier to amend than the Constitution; agencies do not 
have the same obligation to follow precedent that courts have; and 
agencies are correspondingly freer to base their decisions on judgments 
about good policy.  But the same forces that create anomalies in consti-
tutional law — the difficulty of enacting an authoritative text that is 
specific enough to accomplish its objectives but flexible enough to 
adapt to unanticipated circumstances — may be responsible for the 
Chevron doctrine (and its antecedents) and for the issues that doctrine 
trails in its wake.  If that is so, then the apparent anomalies in consti-
tutional law might not be so anomalous after all.  Mixed systems, tak-
ing authoritative texts and common law–like evolutionary processes 
and combining them in a way that lacks clear priority rules, may be 
the norm. 
III.  THE ANOMALIES 
The anomalies — instances in which the text of the Constitution 
seems inconsistent with well-established principles of constitutional 
law — are the most vivid evidence that U.S. constitutional law is not a 
text-based system.  Of course, if you assert that a text is inconsistent 
with something, you are implicitly assigning a meaning to the text.  
But in the case of the anomalies, the meanings are pretty clear.156  
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There is no need to resort to controversial theories of interpretation to 
show that the anomalies exist. 
The claim about the anomalies is not that it is impossible to read 
the language in a way that is consistent with the established principles.  
We do read it that way; in a sense, that is precisely the point.  The 
claim is rather that the established principles are inconsistent with the 
most straightforward or natural reading.  At the very least there is a 
tension between the text and the established principles, although I be-
lieve that understates the extent of the inconsistency in these cases.  
Something is causing us to “interpret” the language in the way we 
have.  That something, as I have said, is the common law–like process 
that is characteristic of U.S. constitutional law. 
Implicit in all of this is Chief Justice Marshall’s famous statement 
that “it is a constitution we are expounding.”157  We should not expect 
to treat the Constitution as if it were any ordinary text.  But Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s dictum is just the starting point.  The idea is to see, as 
best we can, what we are doing when we “expound” the Constitution.  
Expounding the U.S. Constitution means operating in a mixed system 
that comprises precedent as well as the text, and in which provisions 
of the Constitution often, as I have suggested, seem to function roughly 
in the same way as precedents.  One way to put the point might be 
that the proper interpretation of the text, or the true meaning of the 
text, is one that harmonizes the text with the precedents and other 
sources of law.158  Using terms like “interpretation” and “meaning” is 
problematic if it suggests that the text is foundational.  But if we leave 
that implication aside, some version of that view seems to me correct.  
And it follows that fundamentalism is a mistake, and we should recon-
sider the notion that constitutional law is derived from the text in 
some meaningful way. 
It might be tempting to dissolve some of the anomalies by recourse 
to originalism — to say, for example, that the original understanding 
(somehow defined) of the Free Speech Clause was that it applied to the 
entire federal government, even though the language is limited to Con-
gress; or that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood to incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights.  For most of these anomalies, original under-
standings don’t help; there is not much doubt that the language of the 
constitutional provision, given its ordinary meaning, is consistent with 
the original understanding.  But even when that is not true, resorting 
to the original understanding does not solve the problem posed by the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 157 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).  
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anomalies.  That is because, as I noted earlier, there are many well-
settled instances in which constitutional law departs from original un-
derstandings.  So even if the original understandings could resolve 
some of these anomalies, the question would be why we invoke the 
original understandings in these cases and not, for example, to discred-
it the cases that say the Equal Protection Clause forbids discrimination 
against women — a pretty uncontroversial example of a settled princi-
ple that is inconsistent with original understandings.  If the answer to 
that question is that we resort to original understandings in order  
to save principles that are already well established — like the incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights — but not when the original understand-
ings would undermine established principles, then, necessarily, some-
thing other than either the text or the original understandings is 
determining the content of constitutional law. 
A.  The First Word of the First Amendment 
The First Amendment is uncontroversially understood to protect 
freedom of speech, and the other rights it lists, against all three 
branches of the federal government.  But the amendment provides 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”159  On its face, the amendment applies to “Congress” 
alone.  Elsewhere, the Constitution defines “Congress”: it “shall consist 
of a Senate and House of Representatives.”160  (As Chief Justice  
Roberts remarked in his dissent in Arizona State Legislature, “[w]hen 
seeking to discern the meaning of a word in the Constitution, there is 
no better dictionary than the rest of the Constitution itself.”161)  The 
division of the federal government into the three branches is founda-
tional; it structures the entire original Constitution.  And the First 
Amendment specifically says that “Congress shall make no law”; the 
other branches of the federal government do not make laws.  So it 
seems odd to suggest that “Congress” should be read to include the 
other branches of the federal government. 
What’s more, no other provision of the Bill of Rights is phrased in 
the same way as the First Amendment.  The other provisions refer to 
the “right” of the people162 or of an individual,163 or they simply say 
that certain actions are not allowed.164  It would have been easy 
enough to phrase the First Amendment in the same way: to say, for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 159 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 160 Id. art. I, § 1.  
 161 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2680 (2015) 
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 162 See U.S. CONST. amends. II, IV. 
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example, that the rights of free speech and free exercise of religion 
shall not be abridged.  This suggests that the First Amendment’s refer-
ence to Congress was advertent. 
It is possible, of course, that the drafters of the First Amendment, 
when they wrote “Congress,” meant to refer to the entire federal gov-
ernment, and that the First Amendment was understood in this way.165  
But, as I said, we do not uniformly follow original understandings 
even to clarify vague provisions of the Constitution; why would we al-
low original understandings to defeat the straightforward meaning of 
“Congress”?  Unless, of course, the content of constitutional law is de-
termined by principles about free expression we have arrived at over 
time, through an evolutionary process. 
This is not a case of an obvious glitch in the text, something that 
no rational person could have meant (like the comma that seems to 
make everyone born in the last 227 years ineligible to be President166).  
The premise of the separation of powers is that different branches 
have different virtues and vices; it is certainly possible that Congress 
presents a greater threat to the freedom of speech and religion than the 
President does.  The assertion that “Congress” in the First Amendment 
must just be a stand-in for the entire government, because otherwise 
freedom of speech would be endangered,167 reflects the view of free 
speech we have developed over time.  It might be the right view, but it 
is hard to make the case that that is what the text says. 
Some fundamentalists, biting the proverbial bullet, say that the 
First Amendment applies only to Congress, not to the President or the 
courts.168  One version of the fundamentalist position is that the Presi-
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 165 See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell, J.) (“As this 
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dent is in effect forbidden to abridge the freedom of speech not by the 
First Amendment but by the Take Care Clause or the Due Process 
Clause.169  The argument is that those clauses provide that the Presi-
dent must act according to law, and, leaving aside inherent presidential 
powers granted by Article II, that means that the President may act 
only in ways authorized by Congress.170  If Congress has authorized 
the President to abridge the freedom of speech, then Congress has vio-
lated the First Amendment.171  If the President abridges the freedom 
of speech without congressional authorization, then he has acted ultra 
vires, in violation of the Due Process Clause or the Take Care 
Clause.172  Either way, the argument concludes, the President is in 
practice forbidden to abridge the freedom of speech.173 
A quick way to see the problem with this argument is that it would 
make the Pentagon Papers case, New York Times Co. v. United 
States174 — which is ordinarily considered one of the great First 
Amendment cases — not a First Amendment case at all.175  In the 
Pentagon Papers case, the government sought an injunction against 
the publication of documents containing national security secrets.176  
No statute authorized the injunction;177 the government asserted  
that the President had inherent power, under Article II, to seek the  
injunction.178 
On the fundamentalist view of the First Amendment, the only 
question would have been whether the President had that power under 
Article II.  If he did, his action was lawful, irrespective of anything 
having to do with freedom of speech.  If he did not have that power, 
then his action was unlawful, again for reasons unrelated to freedom 
of speech.  It might be tempting to say that the President’s powers 
should be construed narrowly when they might be used to abridge free 
speech.  But the text of the First Amendment gives us no basis for 
thinking that potential presidential abridgment of the freedom of 
speech is a concern.  In fact one could even infer from the way the Bill 
of Rights is written — with the First Amendment, alone among the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, limited by its terms to Congress — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1157 (1986) 
(arguing that while the First Amendment may apply to the President, it does not apply to courts).  
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 170 See id. at 609–10. 
 171 See id. 
 172 See id. 
 173 See id. at 610–11. 
 174 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).  
 175 See Bradley & Siegel, supra note 88, at 1244–47. 
 176 New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714. 
 177 Id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 178 Id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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that the First Amendment conveys an affirmative willingness to allow 
the President to take actions that abridge the freedom of speech. 
Needless to say, none of the litigants, none of the judges, and none 
of the observers saw the Pentagon Papers case this way.  Some of the 
Justices did mention the absence of congressional authorization,179 but, 
of course, none of them suggested that the First Amendment was irrel-
evant.  On the contrary, the case was seen then, and is seen today, as 
one of the great First Amendment landmarks. 
The Pentagon Papers case suggests a general problem with the 
fundamentalist argument that the First Amendment does not apply to 
the President: in the exercise of his inherent powers, the President 
might abridge the freedom of speech or religious freedom in ways that 
we would find intolerable.  The President may not abuse his inherent 
powers; when he acts as Commander in Chief, for example, he must 
exercise reasonable, good faith judgment in that role.  (The courts 
might not enforce this limit on his power, but the Constitution imposes 
it nonetheless, and the President would violate his oath of office if he 
breached it.)  But he might, for example, conclude that certain reli-
gious or political groups present a greater danger to national security, 
or are more suited to especially dangerous military operations.  On the 
fundamentalist view, concerns about religious freedom and freedom of 
speech would be irrelevant. 
The problem with the fundamentalist view of the First Amendment 
goes beyond the President’s inherent powers under Article II.  The 
fundamentalist view would also exempt more familiar executive 
branch actions from free speech principles.  It is surely correct to say, 
as fundamentalists do, that Congress abridges the freedom of speech if 
it commands the executive branch to do something that constitutes an 
abridgment.  But the typical pattern is that Congress enacts a statute 
prohibiting some form of private conduct and implicitly or explicitly 
gives the President discretion in deciding how to enforce the statute.  If 
the President (or his delegate) then enforces the statute in a way that 
abridges the freedom of speech or the free exercise of religion, it is the 
executive branch — not Congress — that has abridged the freedom.  
In such a case, the crucial decision was made by the President, not by 
Congress.  It is implausible, or at least strained, to read the First 
Amendment to apply to instances in which the crucial decision was 
made by the President, when the President has been excluded from the 
scope of the amendment’s prohibition.  Or to paraphrase what the 
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Court has said in a different context, granting the President the power 
to abridge a freedom does not itself abridge the freedom.180 
There is something artificial about suggesting that executive 
branch actions that interfere with freedom of speech or freedom of re-
ligion don’t violate the Constitution — or so it seems to us.  But that is 
just testimony to the power of nontextual constitutional principles that 
have been developed over time by judicial and nonjudicial precedents.  
Of course, we think, the President cannot “violate someone’s First 
Amendment rights.”181  But we think that because the principles of 
free expression have taken hold in a way that has become detached 
from — and may never have been all that securely connected to — the 
words of the First Amendment.  
B.  The Establishment Clause 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion.”182  When the First Amend-
ment was adopted, a number of states had established churches.183  A 
straightforward reading of the Establishment Clause is that Congress 
could not interfere with those state establishments.184  It is difficult to 
see what other meaning the Establishment Clause might have had.  
There was no federal establishment, and if the Establishment Clause 
had been designed simply to keep Congress from establishing a 
church, it could have just forbidden Congress from doing that.  In-
stead, it used the obviously broader language — “respecting an estab-
lishment” — that would prohibit not just an establishment but a dises-
tablishment, necessarily of the states’ established churches. 
Today, the Establishment Clause — as “incorporated” by the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and applied to the states — 
is interpreted to forbid states from establishing churches or aiding reli-
gion in certain ways.185  Incorporation itself raises questions about 
how seriously we take the text, especially when a provision specifically 
limiting Congress’s power over the states is somehow applied to the 
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 180 Cf. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 135 S. Ct. 913, 921–22 (2015) (holding that a stat-
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states.186  But if we accept incorporation, then the Establishment 
Clause, as incorporated, authorizes the federal courts — and Congress, 
using its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment — to 
forbid states from establishing religion.  To say that Congress may for-
bid states from establishing religion seems to be the opposite of what 
the Establishment Clause says.187  And if we read “Congress” in the 
First Amendment to mean “the federal government” — as we must, to 
avoid the problems with the freedom of speech and the freedom of re-
ligious exercise — then the federal courts also contravene the text 
when they forbid state establishments. 
Except for a few aberrational opinions,188 the courts do not con-
front this problem, just as they do not confront the problem with 
“Congress.”  There is a plausible justification for the current under-
standing of the Establishment Clause, but it is basically an evolution-
ary, common law–like account.  In the first decades of the nineteenth 
century, the argument goes, states abolished their religious establish-
ments, and the idea took hold that religious establishments are incon-
sistent with the principles of religious liberty found in the First 
Amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868, then in-
corporated that “version” of the First Amendment.189 
This certainly may be the right way to think about religious estab-
lishments.  It has the virtues of a common law approach, because it 
takes into account changes, over time, in people’s understandings.  
And it does lead us to where we are today.  But this approach cannot 
be derived from the text alone.  The Establishment Clause itself, read 
in a straightforward way, leads, if anything, to the opposite conclusion.  
The Fourteenth Amendment, even assuming it is properly interpreted 
to incorporate the Bill of Rights, does not specify that it incorporates a 
version of the Establishment Clause that had evolved in a way that is 
at variance with that clause’s text.  It will not do simply to invoke 
original understandings,190 because we do not accept the original un-
derstandings of the Fourteenth Amendment in many other respects.  In 
any event, if the Fourteenth Amendment is understood to incorporate, 
not the text of the Establishment Clause, but an evolved understand-
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ing of its underlying principles, then the question is why the amend-
ment should be understood to freeze the understanding that obtained 
when it was adopted, rather than allowing a continuing evolution; cer-
tainly the text does not dictate that result. 
In other words, we could deal with the application of the Estab-
lishment Clause to the states by viewing the Fourteenth Amendment 
as a font of evolving, common law–like constitutional law on issues re-
lating to state aid to religion.  But there is no apparent reason — cer-
tainly none in the text — to stop at religion, instead of saying that the 
Constitution embraces an evolving understanding of all issues relating 
to the Bill of Rights.  And that would amount to a nearly unequivocal 
embrace of a common law view of the Constitution that often leaves 
the text behind — which is, I believe, our system.   
C.  Electronic Surveillance 
The Fourth Amendment provides in part that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violat-
ed . . . .”191  If the government captures an electronic communication 
by intercepting radio waves, or by tapping into cables that are not on 
private property, then the government’s access to the communication is 
not the product of a search or seizure of a “house” or a “person” in any 
ordinary sense.  Nor is the government’s action a search or a seizure of 
one’s “papers” or “effects.”  Much of what’s distinctive about electronic 
communications is precisely that they are an alternative to “papers.”  
And it is hard to imagine anyone referring to a phone call as part of 
his or her personal “effects.” 
So, judging from the text alone, the Fourth Amendment does not 
seem to limit the government’s power to intercept electronic communi-
cations, if the government does so without, for example, invading a 
house.192  The Court so held in Olmstead v. United States,193 over a 
celebrated dissent by Justice Brandeis.  The Court overruled Olmstead 
in Katz v. United States.194  Justice Black dissented in Katz precisely 
on the ground that the Court had departed from the language of the 
Fourth Amendment.195  Justice Black emphasized that the terms of the 
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Fourth Amendment refer to tangible objects, and electronic communi-
cations are not tangible.196 
It is tempting to try to answer Justice Black’s position by saying 
that we should be allowed to update the Constitution in order to ac-
count for technological innovations that obviously could not have been 
anticipated when the Constitution was adopted.  The Constitution 
makes the President “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States”;197 the omission of the Air Force does not seem to 
be something that should trouble us.  It is not obvious that this kind of 
updating is permissible; arguably that is what amendments are for.  
But if we do allow that kind of updating, certain kinds of electronic 
surveillance might come within the terms of the Fourth Amendment.  
Emails, or information stored in digital form, for example, might qual-
ify as “papers.” 
Part of Justice Black’s argument, though, was that the electronic 
interception of telephone calls is a version of eavesdropping, and un-
aided eavesdropping by itself has never been regarded as a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.198  The point is not 
just about history: a search or seizure of one’s person or one’s tangible 
effects is not the same kind of intrusion as listening to communica-
tions.199  There is a more general point.  Katz inaugurated a develop-
ment that reoriented the Fourth Amendment away from the kinds of 
interests that have traditionally been protected by the law of torts and 
toward a more general notion of privacy.  In the process, the courts did 
not follow, in any remotely rigorous way, the words of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The key terms in what we call the law of the Fourth 
Amendment are “privacy” and, more specifically, “reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy” — terms that, of course, are not in the text.  This re-
orientation has become a deeply entrenched part of our law, and it cer-
tainly seems justified.  But it is hard to reconcile with the text. 
D.  The Equal Protection Clause and Voting 
Ever since Justice Holmes’s opinion in Nixon v. Herndon,200 the 
Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids racial discrimination in voting.  In the 
1960s, the Court relied on the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a 
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number of other restrictions on voting and to require state and local 
legislative bodies to be apportioned according to the principle of “one 
person, one vote.”201  But in fact a straightforward reading of the text 
makes it clear that the Equal Protection Clause does not require equal-
ity in voting.  Justice Harlan made that argument (also invoking the 
history of the Fourteenth Amendment) in his dissents in the reappor-
tionment cases,202 and it was anticipated by Minor v. Happersett,203 
which held, in 1874, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not give 
women the right to vote.204 
The argument, in a word, is that the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects the right to vote (to the extent it protects it) with a liability rule, 
not an entitlement: states are free to restrict the franchise if they are 
willing to pay the price.  Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment  
provides: 
[W]hen the right to vote at any election for [federal or state offices] is de-
nied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation [in 
the House of Representatives] shall be reduced in the proportion which 
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male 
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.205  
That is, if a state disenfranchises certain male citizens over the age 
of twenty-one, its representation in the House will be reduced accord-
ingly.  A state that wanted to disenfranchise African Americans could 
do so (before the Fifteenth Amendment was adopted), as long as it ac-
cepted reduced representation.  If the Equal Protection Clause in sec-
tion 1 of the amendment prohibited states from denying the right to 
vote, then states would not have the option that section 2 clearly seems 
to give them. 
It is possible to read the Fourteenth Amendment in a different way.  
It’s not unusual for regulatory regimes to have overlapping or duplica-
tive remedies — civil and criminal remedies, for example, or remedies 
initiated by both private parties and the government.  You could see 
the Equal Protection Clause as providing a judicial remedy (an injunc-
tion against disenfranchisement) as a backup if Congress fails to in-
voke the section 2 remedy of reducing the state’s representation.  An 
injunction might even be an independent remedy that would be avail-
able irrespective of what Congress did — which is, essentially, how the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted. 
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But that is, quite clearly, not the most straightforward reading of 
the words.  Section 2 refers explicitly to voting, and it provides both a 
detailed right (available only to certain men over the age of twenty-
one) and a specific remedy.206  Section 1 does not refer to voting at 
all.207  It does not explicitly establish a right to vote, and it does not 
specify a remedy.  The amendment as a whole says nothing about how 
the section 2 remedy should be harmonized with a supposed remedy 
available under section 1.208  Read naturally, the amendment does not 
seem to provide dual remedies. 
There is an even more important point, though.  Other provisions 
of the Constitution forbid certain kinds of discrimination in voting, 
and reading those provisions together tells us a lot about how we in-
terpret the Constitution.  Specifically, it demonstrates that we read the 
Constitution according to the approach reflected in the passages I 
quoted earlier from Justice Stone’s article209 — an approach that treats 
textual provisions as themselves a kind of precedent, to be harmonized 
with other precedents, and with judgments of fairness and good policy, 
in a common law–like way.210 
The original Constitution left the composition of the electorate, 
even for federal elections, almost entirely to state law.  The House of 
Representatives was to be chosen by the “People of the several States,” 
and the “Electors” of the House were to have the “Qualifications requi-
site for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legisla-
ture.”211  And of course Article IV provides that “[t]he United States 
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government.”212  But beyond that, states had a free hand. 
Then, bit by bit, the text was amended to impose limits on the 
states.  Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the first such lim-
it.  The Fifteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination in voting on 
the basis of “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”213  The 
Nineteenth Amendment provided that “the right of citizens of the 
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of 
sex.”214  The Twenty-Third Amendment gave voting rights in presi-
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dential elections to the District of Columbia.215  The Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment effectively forbade poll taxes in federal elections,216 and 
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment effectively enfranchised eighteen-year-
olds.217 
If one were just to read the text — certainly if one were to read it 
as one would an ordinary statute — the implication would be clear: 
the People (in amending the Constitution) had, over time, decided to 
carve out certain specific exceptions to the original principle of state 
control over the franchise.  Those exceptions were very significant, but 
they were clearly defined.  To say that in fact, all along, while the Peo-
ple were expanding the franchise step by considered step, judges had 
(by virtue of the Equal Protection Clause) an across-the-board power 
to expand the franchise as they wished on the basis of an undefined 
notion of equality — that seems like a very odd way to read a text 
characterized by calibrated extensions of voting rights. 
But the oddity disappears if you recognize that, in dealing with the 
Constitution, we use something closer to the approach described by 
Justice Stone.  If you take that view, then the successive expansions of 
the franchise should not be treated as isolated commands of the sover-
eign people, to be followed according to their specific terms.  Instead, 
they should be treated more like precedents.  And there are 
extratextual precedents, as well.  Property qualifications, which were 
fairly common when the Constitution was adopted, were abandoned 
by the states during the first decades of the nineteenth century, without 
a constitutional amendment.218  Presidential electors in every state 
came to be chosen by popular vote.  The franchise was expanded in 
other ways as well.219 
Given all of those “precedents,” it was appropriate for courts to 
proceed — in a common law–like way — to add into the mix their 
own judgments about the importance of equality in voting.  Those 
common law–like judgments, not the text, are the basis of the now 
completely established principle that the Equal Protection Clause pro-
tects the right to vote;220 the same kind of judgments established the 
principle of “one person, one vote.”221  You cannot get there from the 
text alone.  But you can get there by recognizing the essentially com-
mon law–like character of U.S. constitutional law, when the common 
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law is understood to include textual provisions as well as judicial and 
nonjudicial precedent.222 
E.  Equal Protection Means Equal Protection 
This may be the most counterintuitive of the anomalies.  The 
Equal Protection Clause — infamously derided by Justice Holmes as 
“the usual last resort of constitutional arguments” as late as 1927, in 
Buck v. Bell223 — has become so central to modern constitutional law 
that the words seem to have taken on a new meaning.  The Equal Pro-
tection Clause is, as has been said countless times, the Constitution’s 
great guarantee of equality.  And so it is, but not because of what it 
says.  The evolutionary development of the law — not the text — de-
termines what the law is, and the Equal Protection Clause is now a 
guarantee of equality because that is how the law has evolved.  What 
“equality” means will be worked out by the usual common law meth-
ods.  But if we are adhering to the text, the clause does not say “equal-
ity” or “equal treatment” or “equal status” or anything like that.  It  
uses a narrower term.  The modern Equal Protection Clause has taken 
shape notwithstanding its language. 
Of course there is a sense in which one might say that all laws 
“protect” people — from other people’s hostile actions, from misfor-
tune, from market forces, or from the arbitrary behavior of executive 
officials, for example.  That seems to be the basis of the Court’s state-
ment in Yick Wo v. Hopkins224 that “the equal protection of the laws is 
a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”225  But this sweeping under-
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 222 There is an additional complication in dealing with voting rights.  Some defenders of the 
“one person, one vote” decisions have argued that the Court relied on the wrong constitutional 
provision: it should have invoked the Guarantee Clause of Article IV.  See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 
187, at 190.  Certainly that clause requires the United States to do something about voting rights 
in the states.  A state could not establish a monarchy, for example.  But the text just does not give 
much guidance of the kind we would need to resolve specific controversies.  
  One difficulty with saying that the Guarantee Clause establishes the principle of “one per-
son, one vote” is that the United States itself would, then, not have a republican form of govern-
ment — because the Senate violates that principle.  See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Guru 
Dakshina, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1787, 1793–94 (reviewing AMAR, supra note 187).   
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JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 205–29 (2006).  The first option, when applied to the Consti-
tution, encounters familiar problems: there are too many instances in which we reject the original 
understandings of what a provision would do as a basis for current law.  The second — allowing 
some interpreter discretion to fill out the contents — is consistent with the common law–like 
character of constitutional law.  
 223 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). 
 224 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 225 Id. at 369. 
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standing of the term “protection” would be inconsistent with the con-
clusion — strongly supported by the text, as I’ve said — that the 
Equal Protection Clause does not guarantee an equal right to vote.  
That right certainly seems to provide an especially important form of 
“protection,” if that word is used in an extended sense.  More generally, 
if “equal protection of the laws” means equal protection from all the 
kinds of adversity that people might encounter, then the clause seems 
indistinguishable from a more broadly worded one that simply re-
quires equality, or equal treatment.  And it would be very questionable 
simply to treat a relatively specific word like “protection” as if it were 
a more general term like “treatment.” 
An argument about the original understanding is useful here, al-
though it has many of the problems that accompany most such argu-
ments.  So it cannot be taken as authority for how the text should be 
interpreted — only as an account that gives a sense of why the text 
says what it does.  The argument is that section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to secure the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866226 (there is general agreement that this was at least 
one of the purposes of the amendment), and the phrase in the Civil 
Rights Act that seems to be the antecedent of the Equal Protection 
Clause specified that all citizens “shall have the same right . . . to full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person 
and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”227  On this account, the 
Equal Protection Clause provides, essentially, for the equal protection 
of the criminal laws and the law of torts.  Whatever the problems with 
this specific account, it does give a sense of what the natural meaning 
of the term “protection” might be — essentially, protection from pri-
vate violence.228 
In any event it is hard to see how the words of the clause could be 
stretched to mean what they mean today — a prohibition against un-
justified inequality in every realm, including education, recreation, and 
even matters that are entirely symbolic, like the award of a purely cer-
emonial office — while still taking seriously the fact that the clause  
uses the word “protection.”  A person who is excluded from a public 
swimming pool because he or she is a member of a racial minority is 
certainly treated unequally.  But it is not clear that anyone would call 
that treatment a denial of equal “protection” — unless they had the 
clause in mind. 
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F.  Bolling v. Sharpe 
This is a well-known anomaly.  Brown v. Board of Education229 re-
lied on the Equal Protection Clause to hold that state-mandated racial 
segregation in schools was unconstitutional.230  The Equal Protection 
Clause, by its terms, applies to the states.  In Bolling v. Sharpe, a com-
panion case to Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held 
that school segregation in the District of Columbia was also unconsti-
tutional.231  But the District is of course not a state but a component of 
the federal government.  So in Bolling the Court invoked the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment.232 
Ordinarily it would be questionable to interpret a provision refer-
ring only to states to apply to both state and federal governments.  On 
the contrary, the fact that the Equal Protection Clause is limited to 
states would support an inference that the federal government is delib-
erately excluded.  That inference is especially strong because the Citi-
zenship Clause, which precedes the Equal Protection Clause in section 
1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically mentions both the United 
States and the states.233  So if Bolling is to be justified on the basis of 
the text, the argument would have to be that the Constitution forbade 
the federal government to violate equal protection principles even be-
fore the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.  The Equal Protection 
Clause, on this account, just extended to the states the protections that 
were already in force against the federal government. 
But if the textual source for the limits on the federal government is 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, then the Equal Pro-
tection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is redundant — because 
the Fourteenth Amendment also contains a Due Process Clause.234  So 
again, the inference one draws from the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment — which contains both an Equal Protection Clause and a 
Due Process Clause — is that those provisions cover different matters, 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment cannot be used to 
apply equal protection principles to the federal government. 
The remarkable thing about Bolling — the aspect of the case that 
is most illuminating about the nature of our system — is not Bolling 
itself.  As the Court said in the Bolling opinion, it was “unthinkable” 
that segregation might be upheld in the nation’s capital after having 
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 229 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 230 See id. at 495. 
 231 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
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 233 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
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 234 Compare id. amend. V, with id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
  
44 HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 129:1 
been struck down in the states.235  But Bolling might have been seen 
as a case about the District of Columbia, which resembles a state in 
many ways.236  Or perhaps Bolling could have been understood as a 
kind of justified civil disobedience by the Court, part of an effort to 
uproot Jim Crow segregation that warranted extraordinary, and per-
haps extralegal, action.  Alternatively, the Bolling decision might be 
based on the premise that the Due Process Clause forbids irrational 
legislation; that is what the language of the opinion suggests.237  That 
“substantive” use of the Due Process Clause is hardly compelled by the 
text,238 but more important, what is the basis for the conclusion that 
segregation, in particular, is irrational in a way that violates the Due 
Process Clause?  There is no source for that conclusion in the text, and 
it is obviously not what the Framers of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment thought.  So that conclusion would have to rely on 
evolutionary understandings and judgments of fairness and policy,  
rather than on the text alone.239 
What is striking about Bolling is that the principle that the Equal 
Protection Clause effectively applies to the federal government did not 
stop with that case but became deeply entrenched in constitutional 
law, without any real consideration of the textual difficulties.  The 
Court now routinely speaks of the “equal protection component” of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as if there were something 
like an equal protection subsection of the Fifth Amendment.240  And 
no Justice seems to object to the nontextual character of that compo-
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 235 Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.  
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 238 See generally John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. 
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 239 See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 87–88 (2011) (“Bolling . . . 
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 240 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013); Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Weinberger v. 
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nent — not even those Justices who show the strongest fundamentalist 
inclinations, and not even in cases in which they disagree with the ma-
jority’s conclusion that equal protection principles were violated.241 
The Due Process Clause is, as I said, vague enough that one could 
imagine reading it to embrace equal protection principles.  Commenta-
tors have also identified a half-dozen other possible bases for Bolling — 
the Citizenship Clause of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the same section, the Ninth 
Amendment, the Guarantee Clause, the Titles of Nobility Clause, and 
others.242  If you take a step back, it is actually quite clear what is go-
ing on here, and it does not really have much to do with the text.  We 
are starting with a principle that seems as if it must be correct — the 
federal government, like the states, may not engage in race discrimina-
tion or other forms of discrimination that resemble race discrimination 
in relevant respects — and we are finding a way to apply that principle 
to the federal government.  The principle that racial segregation is un-
constitutional comes first, whatever exactly its origins, and the text is 
then “interpreted” in a way that will conform to that principle. 
G.  Expressio Unius and Federal Criminal Law 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution enumerates Congress’s pow-
ers, including the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary 
and proper for carrying into Execution the [other enumerated] Pow-
ers.”243  The Necessary and Proper Clause has, of course, been inter-
preted expansively, beginning with the Court’s decision in McCulloch 
v. Maryland.244  But, as the Court has said many times, “[t]he enumer-
ation presupposes something not enumerated.”245  What powers might 
be off limits to the federal government? 
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 241 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 
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 244 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 245 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).  But see Richard Primus, The Limits of 
Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576, 580 (2014) (arguing that the “internal-limits canon” is incorrect, 
and that Congress may enact “any legislation that would be justified by a grant of general regula-
tory power”).  
  
46 HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 129:1 
In his opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius246 (NFIB), the case dealing with the constitutionality of the 
Affordable Care Act, the Chief Justice, whose views controlled the 
outcome, quoted from a passage in McCulloch in which Chief Justice 
Marshall, speaking for the Court, noted that the power of creating a 
corporation — the power at issue in McCulloch — “is not, like the 
power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a 
great substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as 
incidental to other powers, or used as a means of executing them.”247  
This approach can be seen as an application of the principle of 
expressio unius: the enumeration of certain powers implies the exclu-
sion of powers of comparable significance — other “great substantive 
and independent power[s].”248  Chief Justice Roberts did not develop 
the idea that the Necessary and Proper Clause would be limited in this 
way, but the notion that “great substantive and independent power[s]” 
are off limits has become a theme in some of the literature arguing for 
limits on Congress’s Article I powers.249 
The power to enact and enforce criminal laws seems to be a singu-
larly good candidate for such an off-limits power.  Partly this is intui-
tive: if drafters of a constitution enumerated powers to avoid granting 
the government plenary power, there seem to be few governmental 
powers they would be more concerned with limiting than the power to 
enact criminal laws.  The powers to declare war, to raise armies, and 
to tax are candidates; but those powers are explicitly provided in Arti-
cle I.  Article I does not give Congress a general power to define and 
punish crimes. 
One need not rely on intuition, though, because the text supports 
the same inference.  Section 8 explicitly authorizes Congress “[t]o pro-
vide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current 
Coin of the United States”250 and “[t]o define and punish Piracies and 
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of 
Nations.”251  Article III presupposes that treason will be a crime.252  
Under a standard application of, again, expressio unius, a reasonable 
inference — not ineluctable, but on balance the most plausible reading 
of the text — is that Congress has no general power to create crimes.  
Some powers must be off limits, or else there would be no point to 
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enumeration; the power to punish people for crimes certainly seems as 
significant a power as those that are enumerated; and that power is 
granted, but only in a limited way. 
There is more evidence, too, in the text.  Congress is given the 
power to “coin Money” and “regulate the Value thereof.”253  The power 
to punish counterfeiting certainly seems to be a natural incident of that 
power, the kind of incidental power that would, ordinarily, be clearly 
authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause and so not require an 
explicit authorization.  But there is an explicit authorization.  Unless 
that explicit authorization to punish counterfeiting is redundant, the 
most straightforward inference is that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause does not authorize Congress to enact criminal laws. 
That is where we are led by the logic of a text-based reading of Ar-
ticle I.  (It is also where we are led by the logic, if not the stated con-
clusions, of the commentary that uses the “great substantive and inde-
pendent power[s]” phrase from McCulloch as a basis for limiting 
federal power — commentary that seems to be having some influ-
ence.254)  That is, if we followed the text, nearly all of the federal crim-
inal code, as well as much of the ancillary power to investigate crimes 
and operate a system of criminal punishments, would be unconstitu-
tional.  That conclusion seems utterly implausible today.  It seems to 
be a reductio of the “great substantive and independent power[s]” line 
of argument.  The federal criminal justice system is a well-established 
and important institution, and its constitutionality has been implicitly 
upheld countless times: every time someone is punished for a federal 
crime (other than those explicitly authorized by the Constitution), and, 
in a way, every time a person accused of a federal crime does not raise 
a constitutional challenge.  The conclusion that the federal government 
lacks the power to punish crimes was not even plausible at the time of 
McCulloch.  Chief Justice Marshall went out of his way to say — in 
fact, it seems, to treat it as obvious — that Congress could punish 
someone who stole mail from the post office or who falsified a federal 
record or committed perjury.255 
H.  The Incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
One of the important developments of twentieth-century constitu-
tional law was the application of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to 
the states.  The Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal 
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government, as the Supreme Court held in Barron v. Mayor of Balti-
more.256  In a series of decisions the Court has since held that provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights are “incorporated” through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and now apply to states as well 
as to the federal government.257  But not all the provisions were incor-
porated: the Fifth Amendment requirement that felony prosecutions be 
initiated by a grand jury indictment does not apply to the states, nor 
does the Seventh Amendment requirement of a trial by jury in civil 
cases.258  The Court has also not ruled on whether the Excessive Fines 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies to the states.  But, as the 
Court made clear in holding that the Second Amendment applies to 
the states, incorporation is the default approach to the Bill of 
Rights.259 
Incorporation is difficult to square with the text in several well-
known ways.  The textual difficulty with using the Due Process Clause 
to incorporate substantive rights is familiar: the clause seems to re-
quire only fair procedures.  It would be a natural way to apply some of 
the procedural protections of the Bill of Rights to the states, but it is 
not clear how a failure to protect freedom of speech, for example, can 
be said to violate a clause that requires only fair procedures.  For that 
reason, many people — including Justice Black, the leading champion 
of incorporation in the years when it prevailed — have urged that the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should 
be the basis for incorporating the Bill of Rights.260 
The Privileges or Immunities Clause certainly seems plausible as a 
textual matter; it is natural to suppose that the “privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States”261 include the rights guaranteed by 
the Bill of Rights.  But there are several difficulties.  One is that the 
Supreme Court has, recently and quite emphatically, rejected this use 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, invoking the substantial body 
of precedent that relied on the Due Process Clause262 — a further indi-
cation that when a common law–like development collides with the 
text, the text loses.  Beyond that, as Justice Harlan, an opponent of in-
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corporation, once noted, “privileges or immunities” is not the most 
straightforward way to say that the protections of the Bill of Rights 
apply against the actions of the states — you could say that, for exam-
ple, instead.263  And the Privileges or Immunities Clause refers to the 
privileges and immunities of citizens; it is well established that the Bill 
of Rights protects aliens inside the United States as well.264 
There are other textual problems with incorporation.  The Fifth 
Amendment contains a Due Process Clause; if the Fourteenth 
Amendment incorporates the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment would be redundant.  The principle that a 
text should not be interpreted in a way that makes some provisions re-
dundant is not ironclad, but this is at least another textual problem 
with incorporation.  In addition, some provisions of the Bill of  
Rights — the Establishment Clause and probably the Second Amend-
ment — seem to be federalism provisions, protecting the states against 
federal power.  As I discussed before, in connection with the Estab-
lishment Clause, it seems odd to take a provision that, on its face, pro-
tects states against federal intervention and use it to authorize federal 
intervention against the states.265  And beyond that, there does not 
seem to be a textual basis for excluding the Grand Jury Clause or the 
Seventh Amendment from the default approach to the Bill of Rights. 
There is one final complication.  Even Barron, which held that the 
original Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, does not 
actually have that strong a textual basis — apart from the First 
Amendment’s explicit limitation to Congress, a limitation that, of 
course, has been ignored.  The other provisions of the Bill of Rights 
are written in general terms that could certainly, as a textual matter, 
apply to the states.  The Barron Court’s central premise — that the 
original Constitution established the federal government, so the Bill of 
Rights appended to it should be viewed as a limitation on that gov-
ernment266 — is plausible but not ineluctable. 
So this entire area — so closely associated with the specific text of 
the Bill of Rights — is much less text-based than it may appear.  In-
corporation in the way we have it today is not entirely consistent with 
the text and is in large part a product of a common law–like evolution: 
the Court incorporated provisions on a case-by-case basis, excluded 
certain provisions from incorporation for practical or historical rea-
sons, overlooked textual difficulties with its course, and adhered to 
precedent in the face of those textual problems.  Having said that, it 
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would, obviously, be a mistake to say that the text was unimportant.  
The text provided a relatively clear basis for what the Court was do-
ing, notwithstanding the textual difficulties.267  But incorporation was 
not read off from the text of the Constitution.  A common law–like 
evolution determined the role that the text would play.  In that sense, 
the text, as important as it was, was subordinate to that evolutionary 
process.  That is an inversion of the usual way of thinking about con-
stitutional law, but it is consistent with the way constitutional law ac-
tually works.  
I.  State Sovereign Immunity 
The nontextual basis of state sovereign immunity is also a familiar 
story.  The only explicit basis for state sovereign immunity in the Con-
stitution is the Eleventh Amendment.  The Eleventh Amendment was 
adopted in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chisholm v. 
Georgia,268 which authorized a federal court contract action against 
Georgia by a creditor.  The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judi-
cial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects 
of any Foreign State.”269 
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment seems to say that no suit 
may be brought against a state, in federal court, by a citizen of another 
state or a foreign state.  Read in context, though, the Eleventh 
Amendment might be even narrower: Article III, Section 2 of the Con-
stitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend . . . to Con-
troversies . . . between a State and Citizens of another State . . . and 
between a State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”270  The 
parallel language of the Eleventh Amendment might be interpreted as 
just making an exception to this grant of so-called diversity jurisdic-
tion.  That would leave intact the power of federal courts to hear 
claims brought against a state even by a citizen of another state, if that 
case had another basis in Article III — for example, if the case arose 
under federal law.271 
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But since 1890, the Court has held that states are immune from 
suits in federal court even when those suits are brought by their own 
citizens, raising federal claims.272  The Court has since extended state 
sovereign immunity to admiralty actions273 (even though the Eleventh 
Amendment is limited to cases in law and equity), to suits brought by 
foreign sovereigns274 and Indian tribes275 (not mentioned in the Elev-
enth Amendment), and to claims based on federal law that are brought 
in federal administrative agencies276 or state courts277 (even though the 
Eleventh Amendment addresses only the judicial power of the United 
States).  The Court has also developed an elaborate body of doctrine 
on the question of when Congress can override state sovereign immu-
nity.278  The Court has dealt with the text of the Eleventh Amendment 
by saying that state sovereign immunity was presupposed by the Con-
stitution itself — a presupposition that Chisholm erroneously ignored.  
The Eleventh Amendment closed the gap that Chisholm wrongly 
opened; the amendment, the argument goes, did not purport to be a 
comprehensive definition of the scope of state sovereign immunity.279 
Not surprisingly, there has been a great deal of controversy about 
both the historical claims about sovereign immunity and the present-
day significance of those claims, even assuming they are correct.280  
Whatever one makes of that controversy, though, the development of 
the law of state sovereign immunity greatly complicates not only any 
rigorous fundamentalist claim about the authority of the text but also 
the more widely shared notion that constitutional law begins with the 
text and works from there.  On an ordinary reading, using principles 
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of expressio unius and viewing the Constitution as we generally do, the 
Eleventh Amendment — the only provision explicitly addressing state 
sovereign immunity — should be a comprehensive account.281  If there 
are constitutional presuppositions that override that usual inference, 
then the question is: what other presuppositions might there be, in the 
background, that can defeat the inferences we would usually draw 
from the text?  It is certainly not obvious why the only constitutional 
presupposition that matters should be one having to do with state sov-
ereign immunity.  Are there presuppositions about, for example, equal-
ity, or freedom of expression, or democratic self-government?  How do 
we identify those other presuppositions, if they exist?  And how do we 
apply them to specific constitutional issues? 
Or perhaps state sovereign immunity is sui generis, in which case it 
is just another anomaly, like “Congress” in the First Amendment — 
another counterexample to the claim that the text is primary in consti-
tutional law.  And perhaps the real basis of state sovereign immunity  
is not a quasi-textual, historically validated “presupposition” but sim-
ply — as in so many other areas of constitutional law — the common 
law–like evolution of precedent. 
IV.  SOVEREIGNTY, ADAPTATION, AND SETTLEMENT 
A.  Three Institutional Interests 
The anomalies suggest that constitutional law is a more complicat-
ed enterprise than might first appear.  The idea that we are interpret-
ing the text of the Constitution in some straightforward way is prob-
lematic even apart from the anomalies.  Too many principles, as I said, 
seem to have their source in precedent, with only a loose connection to 
the text.  One might have thought that the text at least controls when 
it is clear.  The anomalies suggest otherwise.  Alternatively one might, 
of course, contend that in these cases, the text is not clear; it is vague 
or ambiguous, so the principles that have developed are at least not in-
consistent with the text.  But that just makes the point.  Our under-
standing of the provisions of the text cannot be separated from the 
common law–like elements of constitutional law.  The principles that 
have evolved over time, and are attributable to precedent and policy, 
are so deeply a part of constitutional law that we unreflectively think 
of the text as saying things that actually were established by the pre-
cedents, not by the text.282  What’s more, there is some reason to think 
that constitutional law is not exceptional in this respect.  In other areas 
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as well, we have to harmonize precedent-based, common law–like de-
velopments with a supposedly authoritative text.  How can we make 
sense of this process? 
My proposal, tentative of course, is that the legal systems within 
which we operate today should be seen as an effort to accommodate 
three institutional interests — what I’ll call the interests in sovereignty, 
adaptation, and settlement.  Different aspects of the legal system de-
velop ways of balancing these interests, and the ways in which they do 
so evolve over time.  So, to simplify, today we emphasize the text in in-
terpreting ordinary statutes, because that seems to be the best way to 
accommodate these interests.  But that might not always have been the 
best way, and a different approach may evolve if our current approach 
proves to be unsatisfactory.  At the same time, as the anomalies show, 
we emphasize the text less in dealing with the Constitution, because 
there a different balance among those three interests seems best. 
The idea of an accommodation among these interests does two 
things.  It provides a justification for the system that we have, and it 
gives actors in that system a sense of how to proceed.  The underlying 
notion is that a legal system exists because there is agreement on cer-
tain norms.283  Exactly who are the parties to the agreement, and what 
counts as agreement — those are very difficult things to specify.284  
But norms, agreed upon in some sense, define what counts as an ac-
ceptable legal argument, and they provide a basis for making a judg-
ment about when an argument is correct.  Something like this has to 
be true if law is capable of being learned and practiced. 
Within the boundaries set by those norms, there is room for good 
faith differences in judgment about what the law is.  And, because the 
norms are ultimately based on agreement, they can change over time.  
My suggestion is that in making arguments within the existing bound-
aries, or in attempting to shift the boundaries, the three interests I 
mentioned are ultimately what we should take into account.  That is 
how the notion of an accommodation among those interests can pro-
vide some guidance.  They are also interests that any reasonable per-
son should accept as interests that a legal system should try to pro-
mote.  That is why they can serve as a justification.  To be a little 
more concrete, if conforming to the text of even an old and nearly 
unamendable Constitution is a good way to accommodate, say, the in-
terest in settlement, then we have a reason that we can give to people 
for conforming to the text.  We do not have to rely on the kind of 
vague and arguably sectarian notions (like claims about an intergener-
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ational community of Americans) that are sometimes offered as a basis 
for adhering to the text.285  And, by the same token, if we cannot  
justify adherence to the text by reference to those interests, then we 
should — in fact, we do — depart from it. 
Not surprisingly these three interests are recurrent themes in politi-
cal theory.  At the risk of great oversimplification, we might associate 
sovereignty with Hobbes, Bodin, and Bentham;286 adaptation with as-
pects of Burke’s thought and the common law tradition more general-
ly;287 and settlement with Hume and his more modern counterparts, 
for example in game theory, who discuss coordination, focal points, 
and the like.288 
Sovereignty refers to the interest in having some institution that 
can intervene and change things.  Today we naturally associate that 
capacity with the legislature and with the process for amending the 
Constitution.  There is an interest in having sovereignty vested some-
where for both practical and, we would say today, democratic reasons.  
The practical reason is that new problems can arise and we should 
have a way to address them quickly and comprehensively.  The demo-
cratic reason is that if large numbers of people believe that something 
should be done, they should, as a general matter, have their way.  In 
fact, a sovereign without some kind of democratic pedigree would be 
unacceptable in societies like ours today.  One can imagine a legal  
system that does not have an entity that is sovereign in any simple 
sense — a system governed entirely by custom, for example.  But the 
modern legal systems with which we are usually concerned do have 
some institution or combination of institutions that serve this interest. 
The interest in adaptation is obvious.  Whatever the initial state of 
a legal system, there will have to be a mechanism to adjust to changes 
in the world — either in circumstances or in people’s assessments of 
whether the laws adequately deal with those circumstances.  In princi-
ple a single entity could serve both the interest in sovereignty and the 
interest in adaptation, intervening on a larger or smaller scale depend-
ing on what was needed.  In practice, though, there will often be a 
natural division of labor, roughly corresponding to the respective roles 
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of a legislature on the one hand and courts and executive agencies on 
the other.  Some institutions are more suited to intermittent but far-
reaching interventions; others are better for gradual adjustments.  
Over time, it seems fair to say, the central role in making adaptations 
has shifted from courts using a common law–like approach to regula-
tory agencies (which often also use such an approach).289 
The interest in settlement is based on the familiar idea that some-
times it is more important that matters be resolved than that they be 
resolved correctly.  While the interest in adaptation is naturally served 
by an evolutionary process, of which the common law is an exam-
ple,290 the interest in settlement is served by various norms that favor 
leaving existing arrangements intact if they seem satisfactory, even if 
they are not optimal, especially if unsettling those arrangements could 
be costly.  One would expect to find these norms throughout the sys-
tem.  The rarity of sunset provisions in legislation may be an exam-
ple.291  The text of the Constitution also serves the settlement function; 
that seems to be the best explanation for why we adhere to the text to 
the extent we do.292  And while the common law–like character of 
much of constitutional law can be seen as a means of adaptation, it is 
also a means of settlement.  It is tempting, and to some degree correct, 
to justify common law practices on broadly Burkean grounds that ap-
peal to the accumulated, trial-and-error wisdom of past generations.293  
But that seems an implausibly grandiose explanation of why courts 
generally follow precedent in ordinary cases.  It is hard to say that the 
wisdom of the ages lies behind a year-old rule about, say, what consti-
tutes an unreasonable search.  But following precedent in those every-
day contexts does serve the interest in leaving imperfect rules settled 
when the costs of unsettlement would be greater. 
B.  Three Puzzles 
These institutional interests give us a way to understand some fea-
tures of our system that are otherwise very puzzling.  To be clear, there 
is no algorithmic solution to the questions raised by our mixed system.  
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But the interests in sovereignty, adaptation, and settlement at least 
give us a way to think about the issues raised. 
1.  The Senate Versus “One Person, One Vote.” — Evolutionary 
processes are important in our constitutional system, but it remains 
true that the text settles many vitally important questions.  One com-
mon example is the age of the President; the President must be thirty-
five years old.294  There is no serious dispute about that, and that pro-
vision is not treated as the source of a body of evolving precedent.  
The text simply settles that question. 
But there are much more important examples of how the text per-
forms a settlement function, and no account of U.S. constitutional law 
can ignore them.  For example, the text determines when the President 
must leave office295 and what to do if the President is disabled.296  
These are questions that could easily become controversial — highly 
controversial, in fact — in circumstances that are not too hard to  
imagine.  So it is very important to settle questions like these.  Evolv-
ing understandings might provide enough settlement, but those under-
standings will probably be less secure than a settlement that is explicit-
ly stated in the text and is generally accepted. 
While uncertainty about issues like presidential succession could 
create enormous problems, it is less important that those issues be set-
tled in an optimal way.  Knowing when, for sure, the presidential tran-
sition will take place is more important than having a presidential 
term of ideal length, whatever that might be.  The text is especially 
well suited to performing the settlement function in these circum-
stances.  The text can state a rule clearly; evolutionary norms are less 
able to do that.  The rule stated in the text will probably be harder to 
change, but since the important thing is settlement, not optimality, that 
is an advantage. 
This feature of the text — its ability to settle matters that should be 
settled — has more general effects.  In particular, it explains the taboo 
against explicitly ignoring the text.  If it were sometimes acceptable 
explicitly to ignore the text, then it might be more difficult to rely on 
the text to settle issues like the date on which the President leaves of-
fice.  The anomalies suggest that this taboo is, to some extent, illusory.  
But, on the other hand, the anomalies mostly go unnoticed, and that is 
a way of preserving the settlement function of the text. 
This is probably the best way to understand why it is unthinkable 
that the “one person, one vote” rule would be applied to the Senate.297  
The provision specifying that each state has two Senators is entirely 
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clear.298  Uncertainty about the composition of the Senate could be 
very troubling, because, among other things, it might raise questions 
about whether certain laws had been validly enacted. 
Of course no one would say that the composition of the Senate is 
an unimportant issue as long as it is settled one way or another.  For 
that reason, as I mentioned earlier, it is not unthinkable that we could 
see a common law–like evolution in which the Senate’s power were 
diminished, in the same way that the power of presidential electors has 
been diminished — and, arguably, in the same way that the power of 
state governments has been diminished.  But that is the form in which 
the principle of “one person, one vote” would assert itself against the 
Senate, if it were ever to do so: the text would remain formally intact, 
so that the ability of the text to settle issues would not be impaired too 
badly. 
2.  The Domain of Originalism. — The problems with originalism 
are well known; as I have mentioned, originalism is inconsistent with 
many central principles of constitutional law.  But while it would be 
implausible to adopt a thoroughly originalist approach to constitution-
al law, it would also be a mistake to reject originalism entirely.  That is 
because democratic sovereignty requires a limited form of originalism. 
The key point is one that Jefferson recognized: original understand-
ings are binding for a time but then lose their force.299  To give a con-
crete example, there are, periodically, proposed constitutional amend-
ments that provide, in substance, that local governments should be 
allowed to conduct “voluntary” prayers in public school classrooms.300  
If such an amendment were adopted, a reasonable observer — let’s as-
sume — would know that the amendment reflected a decision to over-
turn the Supreme Court’s decisions in Engel v. Vitale301 and School 
District of Abington Township v. Schempp302 and to allow states to re-
quire teacher-led prayer in public schools, as long as students were 
permitted to leave the classroom. 
Even after the hypothetical amendment were adopted, its language 
alone — “voluntary prayer” — would not compel the courts to allow 
prayer of the kind Engel and Schempp invalidated.  One can plausibly 
argue that prayer that is officially endorsed, and led by a teacher, is 
not truly voluntary, even if a student may leave the classroom, because 
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of the pressures on students to conform; that argument was one of the 
principal defenses of the Supreme Court’s school prayer decisions.303  
But if an amendment were adopted, with the generally accepted un-
derstanding that it overturned those decisions, it would, I believe, be 
lawless for a court, acting right after such an amendment were adopt-
ed, to say that teacher-led prayer was still unconstitutional because it 
was not “voluntary.”  A court that did that would thwart an exercise of 
democratic sovereignty: if there is a sufficient popular majority that 
wishes to amend the Constitution to accomplish some objective, it 
should be allowed to do so, except, perhaps, in the most extraordinary 
circumstances.  To that extent, originalism can legitimately claim to be 
an element of constitutional law. 
But a decision that would be lawless in the immediate wake of a 
constitutional amendment might be acceptable — in fact is, in our sys-
tem, routinely accepted — after time has passed.  We have, without se-
rious question, departed from the original understandings of many 
constitutional provisions.304  The best way to understand this aspect of 
our practices, I think, is that it reflects a balance of the interests of 
sovereignty and adaptation.  If “the people” make a decision through 
the amendment process, it would be wrong for a court to seize on the 
vagueness in the language of the amendment to thwart them.  But 
over time, the interest in sovereignty fades — this is the familiar  
Jeffersonian point that “[t]he earth belongs . . . to the living”305 — and 
the interest in adaptation becomes correspondingly stronger.  So origi-
nal understandings become less important, and a gradual process of 
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responding to changes (in the world or in people’s views) can lead to 
outcomes that contradict the original understandings. 
We have worked out, over time, this way of dealing with original 
understandings.  We have learned it from our experience with segrega-
tion, among other things.  One can describe it as somehow inherent in 
the notion of interpretation, but I think that is unhelpful.  It is the 
product of an evolution in the way our understandings and our institu-
tions balance the competing interests that underlie a legal system. 
3.  “Majestic Generalities” Versus Technical Clauses. — In his dis-
senting opinion in Arizona State Legislature, Chief Justice Roberts  
implicitly acknowledged the limited role of the text in resolving  
constitutional issues.  He drew a distinction between the “majestic 
generalities” of the Constitution306 — the First and Fourth Amend-
ments were his examples307 — and the occasions on which the Consti-
tution “speaks . . . with elegant specificity.”308  His examples of the lat-
ter were the provision establishing the minimum age for members of 
the House of Representatives and the clause that gives each state two 
Senators.309  The provision at issue in Arizona State Legislature, he ar-
gued, was also an example of the latter, and “there is no real doubt 
about what ‘the Legislature’ means.”310 
This distinction — between constitutional provisions that are spe-
cific, on the one hand, and the “majestic generalities,” on the other — 
has a long and illustrious history.311  The idea is that when a provision 
is specific it must be applied strictly according to its terms, but provi-
sions like the Commerce Clause, the First Amendment, the Due Pro-
cess Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause enact principles, not spe-
cific directives, and their content can be filled in over time by courts 
and other interpreters. 
One problem with this claim is that, for the most part, the text it-
self does not tell us which provisions are specific and which are more 
general — as the disagreement in Arizona State Legislature illustrates.  
The Commerce Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the Self-
Incrimination Clause, for example — and for that matter the First 
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Amendment’s protection of “the freedom of speech” — all might have 
been seen as specific and relatively technical provisions, rather than  
the majestic generalities that they have become.312  The Commerce 
Clause might have been narrowly limited to interstate commercial 
transactions.  The Establishment Clause, rather than applying to gov-
ernment aid to religion generally, might have been read to forbid only 
an officially sanctioned state church.  The Self-Incrimination Clause, 
instead of being seen as foundational to our adversarial system of 
criminal justice,313 might have just provided for a narrow testimonial 
privilege.  And the Free Speech Clause might have extended only as 
far as Blackstone said, to prior restraints on speech.  
These narrow understandings were rejected not because of the lan-
guage of the provisions but because of a series of decisions, over time, 
to treat the provisions as sources of more general principles.  This pro-
cess is an example of what I suggested earlier: provisions of the Consti-
tution, in our system, operate less as authoritative commands and 
more like precedents.  They are expanded or contracted, over time, in 
the same way that the principle of an earlier decision might be.  What 
the Court has done in these other areas — to say nothing of what it 
has done with the anomalies — is, pace Chief Justice Roberts, no more 
adventuresome than what the majority did with the term “Legislature” 
in Arizona State Legislature. 
Similarly, the decision to treat some provisions as not “majestic” — 
as technical provisions that are not the basis for common law–like de-
velopment — is not dictated by language alone.  It is a decision to use 
a provision to serve the settlement function, rather than to permit ad-
aptation.  If, for example, it would have destabilized settled electoral 
arrangements to allow a body other than the legislature to determine 
congressional districts — one might imagine a recurring problem of 
competing factions in some states, each claiming to have drawn the 
district lines that should prevail — then there would be an argument 
for Chief Justice Roberts’s approach.  But in fact the opposite was 
more nearly true.  As the Arizona State Legislature majority showed, 
the term “Legislature” had already been given a more flexible con-
struction, and the dissent’s approach would have jeopardized settled 
arrangements.  Precedent, too, can settle things, and in that instance, it 
had. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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CONCLUSION 
Constitutional law has its share of complexity and mystery, but in 
the end it is law — subject to being manipulated and abused, of 
course, as all law is, but also capable of being applied in good faith.  It 
is easier to apply it in good faith, though, if we have a sense of what it 
involves.  And the presence of the great document can mislead us. 
It hardly needs to be said that the Constitution — the document, 
that is — has played a critical role in American history.  The risk, 
though, is that we will ask it to do too much, and in that way obscure 
the true nature — the true genius, in fact — of our constitutional sys-
tem.  We do not simply read commands from the text.  We do not 
simply implement decisions made when provisions were adopted.  We 
have learned a lot over the years, and much of what we have learned 
is, necessarily, not directly stated in the text.  All of that is part of con-
stitutional law — in many ways the most important part. 
Everyone, really, knows those things.  The risk is that our rhetoric 
about the Constitution sometimes says otherwise, and that rhetoric 
might lead us astray — both in our understanding of the system and in 
the specific decisions we make.  In the end, the Constitution requires 
not following the dictates of the document but working out, over time, 
a complex balance among institutional interests.  That is how we do 
constitutional law, and that may be how we do law in general. 
